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Thesis Outline 
The thesis consist of the following articles: 
I. The Use of Bayesian Belief Nets in Safety Assessment of Software Based Systems.  
(with Gustav Dahll) In Special Issues of International Journal on Intelligent 
Information Systems at FLINS'98, Int. J. General Systems, 24 (2), pp 205-229, 2000. 
II. Assessment of programmable systems using Bayesian belief nets.  
Submitted and accepted for Journal Safety Science, Special Issue on Safecomp-
2000. To be published 2002. (Extended version of the paper: Gran, B.A., Dahll, G., 
Eisinger, S., Lund, E., Norstrøm, J., Strocka, P., and Ystanes, B.: Estimating 
Dependability of Programmable Systems Using BBNs. Computer Safety, Reliability 
and Security, Proceedings from Safecomp 2000, (LNCS 1943), Koornneef F. and van 
der Meulen, M. (Eds), Springer, Berlin , pp. 309-320, 2000.) 
III. The use of Bayesian belief networks for combining disparate sources of information 
in the safety assessment of software based systems.  
Submitted and accepted for International Journal of Systems Science, Special Issue 
on Intelligent Product Support Systems. To be published 2002. 
IV. Applying Bayesian belief net in software safety assessment on a real, safety related 
programmable system.  
In Safety & Reliability, Towards a safer world. Zio, E., Demichela, M., and 
Piccinini, N. (Eds), Politecnico di Torino, Torino, pp. 1045-1052, 2001. 
Appendix: EISTRAM - Experimental Investigation of the PIE-technique. 
(with Harald Thunem) In Safety and Reliability. Lydersen, S., Hansen, G., and 
Sandtorv, H., (Eds), Balkema, Rotterdam, pp 409-416, 1998. 
Paper I presents the motivation for applying Bayesian Belief Networks for combining 
disparate sources of information in the safety assessment of software based systems. A part 
of this motivation is the experiences from the project presented in the appendix. Paper I also 
presents a first proposal for a BBN for System Quality. Paper II has its basis in a project, 
in which the BBN-method was applied for evaluation of a real, safety related programmable 
system (M-ADS), developed according to the avionic standard RTCA/DO-178B. The 
results presented in the paper can be divided into two: 
•= the possibility to transfer the requirements of a software safety standard into BBNs; and 
•= the experiences with respect to the use of the BBN-method. 
Paper III discuss some more on how to combine the Bayesian Belief Net method with the 
software safety standard for safety assessment of software-based systems. It also presents 
how the BBNs can be merged with a network, developed by VTT (Helminen 2000), 
representing evidence from disparate operational environments. This provides additional 
experiences on the applicability of the BBN methodology. Finally, paper IV describes some 
of the findings from the M-ADS project, and discusses some of the results that were 
pinpointed as interesting, strange or counter-intuitive. It is natural to read paper I before the 
other papers, although they can be read independently of each other.  
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The following chapters give an overview of the work covered by the papers, and can be read 
on its own. All the sub-BBNs constructed with respect to how to combine the Bayesian 
Belief Net method with the standard RTCA/DO-178B are also presented. These have been 
left out in the papers due to the large number of BBNs. 
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1 Background 
With the use of programmable equipment in safety critical systems a new aspect was 
introduced, to produce safe software. Therefore there is in many application areas necessary 
with a thorough safety assessment of the system, including intelligent product support 
systems, for a final acceptance or licensing of the system. In many application areas, 
including the field of nuclear power, law regulates this, and a safety case must be put 
forward for the licensing authorities for each safety critical application. A part of this safety 
case is the assessment of the reliability of the system. 
1.1 Reliability assessment of software 
For a hardware component, even in a safety critical system, it is accepted to assume that a 
failure can occur during the lifetime of the system, given that the expected frequency and/or 
consequence of the failure is sufficiently low. The reliability of a hardware system is thereby 
based on failure statistics, i.e. one measures the failure frequency in standard components 
and computes the system reliability on the basis of this, although that this practise may 
ignore the inherent faults in the hardware.  
The characteristics of software make it difficult to carry out such a reliability assessment. 
Software is not subject to ageing, and any failure that occurs during operation is due to faults 
that are inherent in the software from the beginning. Any randomness in software failure is 
due to randomness in the input data. It is also a fact that environments, such as hardware, 
operating system and user needs, change over time. Furthermore, the software behaviour 
may change over time due to maintenance activities. As a consequence, there is a problem 
with the assessment and licensing of systems, both hardware and software, with inherent 
faults. 
Various reliability growth models (Xie, 1991) have been suggested, but they are mainly 
applicable to large commercial systems, and not to safety critical software. The main reason 
is that a computer program implemented in a safety critical system presumably contains no 
known faults, since any revealed fault would be corrected. There is a possibility that it 
contains unknown faults.  
1.2 Confidence in fault freeness 
An alternative reliability measure is the confidence in fault freeness of the program, or more 
generally the upper limit of the bug-size (Voas et al. 1993, Gran and Thunem 1998). The 
PIE-technique (Voas 1992) is a dynamic failure-based technique for performing program 
sensitivity and testability analysis. The acronym stands for Propagation, Infection and 
Execution, which during the analysis are performed in reverse order, i.e. execution of a 
location, infection of the data state, and propagation of a fault to a discernible output. The 
PIE-technique is related to mutation testing and fault-based testing (Ramamoorthy and 
Bastani 1982, DeMillo and Offutt 1991), but while the purpose of most mutation testing 
techniques is to prove the absence of certain classes of faults, the purpose of applying the 
PIE-technique is to identify locations in a program, where faults, if they exist, are more 
likely to remain undetected during testing.  
By applying the PIE-technique to the two larger test cases (Gran and Thunem 1998), we 
observed that the number of locations, which were likely to hide a fault during random 
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testing, was very high. Using several input distributions to test the mutants reduced the 
number of locations. However, the number of locations was still high, for the Power Range 
Monitoring of a nuclear reactor (PRM) program 66 out of 122 tested locations, and for the 
NEW_VTT program, a program that was developed in the Project on Diverse Software - 
PODS (Barnes et al. 1985, Bishop et al. 1986), 142 out of 300 locations. 
The high number of locations that would be likely to hide a fault during testing means that 
one has a large number of pinpointed locations that are candidates for other testing methods 
or testing techniques. In this view one could conclude that the PIE-technique was not very 
efficient. On the other hand, the large number of insensitive locations could be an 
indication of fault tolerant programs, e.g. it can later be proven that the simulated faults will 
have no effect on the program. 
We also wanted to compare the results from the PIE-analysis with the results from testing the 
PODS programs (Barnes et al. 1985). The back-to-back testing of the PODS-programs and 
the error seeding in one of the PODS-programs gave an indication of fault freeness. 
However, there was no guarantee of absence of hidden faults. Furthermore, the results 
depended upon the selected test input distributions and the number of tests. The PIE-analysis 
ended up with a high number of locations that would be likely to hide a fault during testing. 
This indicated that there might be hidden faults, and that one should decrease the confidence 
in fault freeness of the program. On the other hand, the large number of insensitive 
locations could also be an indication of fault tolerant programs, e.g. it can later be proven 
that the simulated faults will have no effect on the program. If this is the case, one has 
reasons to increase the confidence in fault freeness of the program. 
Another problem with measuring the confidence in fault freeness based on statistical testing 
is that the validity of this measurement is highly dependent on a proper choice of test data 
(Leveson 1995). For the PRM program two different input distributions were applied, and 
for the NEW_VTT program five different input distributions were applied. In both cases it 
was observed that the effectiveness of the PIE-technique was improved in the sense that 
more locations became sensitive. However, it is uncertain to which extent the choice of input 
parameters and input distributions was representative with respect to the actual usage profile 
for the programs. 
A final remark from this experiment is that it demonstrates the need of a useful way to 
combine different sources of information to produce a reliability figure. It should be able to 
make use of more information than traditional software testing techniques.  
1.3 Rule based, risk based and judgement based safety assessment 
There are various principles for how system safety assessment is performed. One can, 
however, classify these into some main types: rule based, risk based (probabilistic), and 
judgement based (expert judgement) (Dahll and Gran 2000).  
Rule based safety (also somewhat misleading called deterministic) assessment implies that 
an assessor checks that a system fulfils a set of criteria given in a safety standard. The rule 
based safety assessment approach is for nuclear safety based on two principles: leak tight 
barriers and the concept of defence-in-depth. The principle of leak tight barriers is a 
basic strategy to prevent releases of radioactive materials. The defence-in-depth consist of 
taking into account all potential equipment failures and human errors, and it is applied in 
both the design and the operation phase. In the safety assessment it is assumed that accidents 
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may still occur. The systems are therefore designed and installed to ensure that the 
consequences of such accidents are acceptable for both the public and the environment. 
This type of safety assessment has some advantages. The rules are easy to follow for the 
developer and easy to check for the assessor. On the other side, this method easily gets rigid 
and inadequate to handle new technology. The rules for safe software are normally based on 
consensus among experts of what is required for safety critical software. This is expressed 
through standards and guidelines. 
In a risk based safety assessment the objective is rather to base the licensing on assessing the 
probability of potential risks associated with the system. The authorities, at least in the 
nuclear power area, often require probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The objective is to 
check whether the probability of a major hazard is below a required limit. The first, and 
probably the most well known, probabilistic safety assessment was carried out in 1974 and is 
known as the Rasmussen report (Rasmussen, 1974). It provides the assessment of the 
potential risk of core damage for two power reactors. 
One can in this respect distinguish between the frequentist's and the subjectivist's (or 
Bayesian) interpretation of the probability concept (Welsh, 1996). The frequentist's view on 
probability is best suited to measure properties of mass-produced components, of parameters 
where one has large statistical material, or with results from controlled experiments. This 
interpretation can be applied on the hardware components of a system, and basic rules for 
probability computation can be used to compute the probability of a hazard on the system as 
a whole (Leveson, 1995). The former interprets the probability as the measured frequency 
that a variable is in a specific state. The subjectivist, on the other hand, interprets probability 
as a (subjective) belief in the same. This belief can be supported or refuted by existing 
evidence. 
The assessment of safety critical software is often faced with the problem of approving 
systems for which there are no clear rules, and for which it is difficult to apply probabilistic 
methods. The rules given in standards and guidelines are often imprecise, or they are not 
directly applicable for an actual system. 
Licensing authorities are in many cases faced with the problem of approving systems for 
which there are no clear rules, as e.g. for safety assessment of computer based systems. One 
possibility for assessors and licensing authorities is to make their judgement based on the 
opinion of experts in various fields, including process knowledge, reliability engineering, 
human factors etc. The combined judgement of the different evidences about the system and 
its environment constitutes the basis for approval or not. Methods has been proposed to make 
reliability estimates based on expert judgements about information from different evidences, 
see e.g. research by Cooke (1991) and Pulkkinen (1994).  
2 Safety assessment based on multiple evidences 
The problem with the reliability measures is that they do not take into account that there are 
several factors that are important to software reliability (Dahll 1997), even if they cannot be 
put directly into a reliability formula. Some of these are of qualitative nature, like the 
producers reputation, the development quality etc. Others are measurable, but not directly 
connected to reliability estimation, like program size, program complexity etc. The 
connection between these quantities and software reliability is also of qualitative nature. It is 
suggested to apply traditional methods in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) to software 
(Leveson 1995, Dahll, 1997, Cudleigh and Catmur 1992). As reasons for this choice it is 
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argued that these methods are well tried, standardised, documented and familiar to the 
customers (Stålhane 1997). Furthermore, it allows the customer to contribute with their 
knowledge about the system.  
2.1 Evidences which influences a safety assessment 
A combination of disparate evidences which influences a safety assessment is illustrated in 
Figure 1 in the form of an influence net, i.e. a directed graph where each node represents 
an aspect in the total assessment process (Dahll and Gran 2000). 
The top nodes in the graph represent the basic information sources that are used in the 
acceptance process. This information is penetrated through the net down to the bottom node. 
This represents the safety assessment, which is the main basis for a final acceptance of the 
system.  
Figure 1: Influence graph of a safety acceptance and acceptance process. 
The safety assessment is influenced by a reliability assessment of the system, as well as by 
an evaluation of whether a failure in the system will jeopardise safety. This evaluation can be 
achieved through a hazard analysis of potential risks to plant and environment. Safety 
defences (both against hardware and software failures) may be implemented as additional 
barriers against consequences of failures. A commonly used principle in this respect is 
diversity, i.e. the same functional goal is obtained through different means. The highest 
degree of diversity can be obtained if the same functional goal can be reached with 
completely different functions. This is often required to reach the safety goals of a safety 
critical system in a nuclear power plant. 
The following sections discuss the basic information sources in more detail. In particular it is 
referred to the particular problem concerning assessment of commercial-off-the-shelf 
software (COTS). An important challenge in evaluating safety and reliability when reusing 
software is that the information available to the analyst usually will be different from what is 
normal. Typically, there will be more information from actual usage, while there might be 
less information regarding the software development. 
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2.2 Information about producer and development process 
The avoidance of faults in the program is clearly related to the quality of the development 
process of the software system. A lousy made program can of course be correct, but a well-
documented production procedure, in accordance with accepted standards, enhances the 
assessors confidence in the reliability of the product. This confidence is also enhanced if the 
producer can document a history of producing high quality products.  
To obtain a sufficiently high confidence in the quality, one should require that all parties 
involved in the development follow a quality assurance policy based on well-known 
standards for safety related systems (e.g. IEC publication 880). This may, however, be 
difficult when COTS software modules are concerned, since they are often delivered without 
appropriate information on the development process as well as on the final product itself. It 
may thus be difficult to assess whether the system has been developed according to the 
standards required for safety critical software. 
2.3 Information about the programs 
Detailed information about the software is needed to assess the reliability of its application. 
One aspect is to identify structural properties of the program that makes it vulnerable to 
programming errors. Complexity is obviously one of these, i.e. the more complex a module 
is, the more likely it is that it contains coding faults. Information about the complexity can be 
gained through an analysis of the program listings. However, for COTS software such 
listings are in general not available. It may be difficult to assess the complexity without this, 
but an indication on the complexity of the module can be seen from the complexity of the 
specification. A well-structured and comprehensible explanation of the use of the module is 
also an indication of a well-structured program.  
A third aspect is the inherent complexity of the actual function itself. It is intuitively obvious 
that an adaptive controller is more complex to make, and therefore more error prone, than an 
AND gate, to take two extremes. One way to measure the inherent complexity of a module, 
where one does not have access to the source code, is to write it in a formal way, either as a 
program in high-level language, or as a formal specification, and then define a metric to 
measure the complexity. 
2.4 Information about V&V and testing 
A thorough verification and validation (V&V) and testing activity, at the module level as 
well as on the program as a whole, will increase the confidence in the program, and thereby 
its reliability. Information about the V&V activities can be obtained from various sources, as 
debugging reports, factory acceptance tests, site acceptance tests etc. An important 
information source, in particular for COTS software systems, is test data compiled during the 
development of the system, and during modifications before new releases.  
To measure statement and path coverage for a test, one needs to know the program code in 
the software module. For a COTS module, however, the code is in general not available. An 
alternative is to make a coverage measure based on the specification, e.g. to measure the 
number of properties, or combinations of properties, which are checked by a certain test. If 
an oracle program has been made, an alternative is to instrument this with counters, and 
perform the coverage measurement on this. 
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2.5 Information about usage 
The producers of COTS systems often use proven design as an argument for high 
reliability. This means that a wide range of users has used the system over a long period, 
with no, or few, reported faults. The idea behind this claim is that long user experience 
should reveal all inherent faults, if they exist. So if no faults have been reported over a long 
period, this should be a strong indication on error freeness. 
The number of versions of a COTS system that is released is also relevant information. A 
new version implies changes in the system, and changes may have influence on its 
reliability. It is therefore relevant to know which changes have been made, or at least where 
the changes were made. In an actual application one should know whether any changes have 
been made in the software modules that are used in this application. 
3 The BBN methodology 
A more qualitative type of reliability measure is expressed as a subjective judgement, as a 
belief in fault freeness. The methodology proposed is to use the Bayesian Belief Network 
(BBN) methodology to combine the evidences from different information sources for a 
quantitative assessment of this belief. The objective of using BBNs in software safety 
assessment is to show the link between basic information and the confidence one can have in 
a system.  
3.1 Applying BBN methodology for safety assessment 
A literature survey on the BBN methodology (Chrisman, 1996) gives the impression that the 
main activities in this area up to then have been rather theoretical, and related to the AI area. 
However, there were also references to real applications medical diagnosis, geological 
exploration. The survey contained no references to the use of BBNs in safety assessment of 
programmable systems.  
The SHIP (Safety of Hazardous Industrial Processes) project discusses, the possibility of 
applying BBNs in software safety cases and how to use formalised probabilistic safety 
arguments via BBNs (Delic, Mazzanti and Strigini, 1995, 1997).  
More recently, it has also been applied to software safety assessment. Work in this area has 
been performed in the European projects SERENE (1999), IMPRESS (2000) and DeVa, in 
particular through previous research at the Centre for Software Reliability at City University, 
and present research at Queen Mary, University in London. The research has resulted in 
various papers, e.g. by Bertolino and Strigini (1996a, b, 1998), Neil et. al. (1996a, b, 1998, 
2000, 2001), Fenton and Neil (1999) and Littlewood and Wright (1995, 1997). Ongoing 
work on this topic is also performed at VTT in Finland (Korhonen, 1997, Helminen 2000). 
This has also been the topic for research at the OECD Halden Reactor Project (HRP)  (Dahll 
and Gran 2000).  
3.2 Background 
The Bayesian Belief Networks methodology was introduced in the 1980s, and is in particular 
described in the book by Pearl (1988) and the paper by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988). 
In 1993 the tool HUGIN (Aldenryd, Jensen and Nielsen 1993, Jensen 1996) was introduced, 
which made BBNs feasible. The theory, however, is based on the Bayes rule, discovered by 
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Sir Thomas Bayes (1744-1809) which says for two variables X and Y that P(X|Y)= 
P(Y|X)*P(X)/P(Y). By allowing {Xi} be a complete set of mutually exclusive instances of X, 
this formula can be extended. A description of Bayesian interference, Bayesian network 
methodology and theory for calculations on BBNs can also be found in the books by Gelman 
et al. (1995), Welch (1996), Cowell et al. (1999), the report by Pulkkinen and Holmberg 
(1997), and older references such as Whittaker (1990), and Speigelhalter et al. (1993). 
A BBN is a connected and directed graph, consisting of a set of nodes and a set of directed 
arcs (or links) between them. Uncertain variables, both events and singular propositions, are 
associated to each node where the uncertainty is expressed by a probability density. The 
probability density expresses our confidence to the various variable outcomes, and depends 
conditionally on the status of the parent nodes at the incoming edges. The nodes and 
associated variables can be classified into three groups: 
•= Target node(s) - the node(s) about which the objective of the network is to make an 
assessment. A typical example of such nodes is No faults in a program. 
•= Intermediate nodes - nodes for which one have limited information, or only beliefs. The 
associated variables are the hidden variables. Typical hidden variables represent quality 
aspects such as development quality, producers reputation, or quality at a certain 
stage of the development without discussing quality in detail. 
•= Observable nodes - nodes that can be directly observed. Some examples are nodes 
representing observable properties about the system for evaluation: no failures during 
testing and all quality requirements are fulfilled.  
Application of the BBN method consists of three tasks:  
•= construction of BBN topology;  
•= elicitation of probabilities to nodes and edges; and  
•= making computations. 
3.3 The construction of BBN topology 
The literature on BBNs has mostly presented small complete BBNs (Neil et al. 2000). The 
construction of small BBNs can be made gradually. Information about the system is 
collected and expressed via the nodes. The nodes are connected to a directed graph that 
expresses the conditional relationship between the variables. The aim is to combine the 
information in the net. One way is to start from a target node and draw edges to influencing 
nodes. To decide the direction of an edge, one can follow the causal direction (Dahll and 
Gran 2000). However, this direction is not always obvious, in particular between nodes 
representing qualitative variables. In these cases the direction of the arrow often goes from 
higher abstraction to lower abstraction, or from the more general concept to the more 
detailed. A general interpretation of an arrow between two nodes A and B is that a belief 
in A implies expectations on B. The practical procedure is to start with constructing a BBN, 
containing nodes representing high-level information.  
When building larger-scale BBNs this procedure is rather effort consuming. Neil, Fenton and 
Nielsen (2000) offer a solution based on building blocks (idioms), which serve solution 
patterns. These can then be combined into larger BBNs. This approach is applied in the 
SERENE project (1999), and has been applied to construct large-scale BBNs for predicting 
software safety. The use of idioms is also applied for the construction of the BBNs presented 
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in the next chapter. However, the BBNs are not of such large-scale, so it is also possible to 
argue through the causal direction approach. 
3.4 The elicitation of probabilities 
The second step is the elicitation of probability distribution functions (pdfs) to the nodes and 
edges. To begin with, one gives prior pdfs for the top nodes, and conditional pdfs for the 
influences represented by the edges. These pdfs may be either continuous functions or they 
have a discrete form. The latter means that the ranges of the variables are divided into finite 
number of states.  
The advantages of the pdfs in discrete form are that it becomes conceptually easier in an 
expert judgement to assign discrete values, and that it makes the computation simpler. The 
conditional probabilities for edges between discrete variables are given as conditional 
probability tables between the states of the variables associated with the start node and the 
end node of the edge respectively. However, since many of the aspects to be considered are 
of qualitative nature and not directly measurable estimation may be difficult. This was 
observed for the co-operative project between the Halden Project (HRP), Kongsberg 
Defence & Aerospace AS (KDA) and Det Norske Veritas (DNV), even if some of the 
project members can be considered as experts in their fields (Gran et. al. 2000). It is 
therefore highly recommendable to make use of some expert judgment tools or expert 
judgment expertise. Another observation was that the establishment of the BBNs and prior 
conditional pdfs was rather time consuming.  
The problem of defining the node probability tables is also addressed by Neil, Fenton and 
Nielsen (2000). They apply a divide and conquer approach to build the BBNs. This 
manages the complexity of the BBNs, and thereby reduces the number of probability values 
to be addressed.    
3.5 Making computations 
Making computations with BBNs above a certain size and complexity is rather difficult by 
hand, but is easy by applying the latest computerised tools. At HRP the HUGIN tool 
(Aldenryd, Jensen and Nielsen 1993) has been used, and in the M-ADS project both the 
HUGIN tool and the SERENE methodology (1999) were applied.  
The computation of our belief about a specific node (target node) is based on the rules for 
conditional probability calculations given by the Bayesian methodology. The procedure is to 
insert observations in the observable nodes, and then use the rules for probability calculation 
backward and forward along the edges, from the observable nodes, through the intermediate 
nodes to the target node, which again can be an intermediate node in a BBN at a higher level. 
Forward calculation is straight forward, while backward computation is more complicated 
(Spiegelhalter et. al. 1993). For details on computations see the references in the beginning 
of this section, and for good examples on making computations with BBNs see for example 
Pearl (1988) and Jensen (1996). 
4 A BBN for System Quality 
A first attempt to construct a BBN for safety assessment, (Dahll and Gran 2000), was based 
on the influence net given in Figure .1. An extended version of this influence graph can be 
found as the safety acceptance and acceptance process of the software (Dahll 2001). These 
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are not themselves BBNs, but quite similar, so it was fairly straightforward to construct a 
high level BBN for system quality based on this (Dahll and Gran 2000), see the BBN 
shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: BBN for the node System Quality. 
The BBN was constructed gradually by applying the causal approach, combining the target 
node(s) with the observable and the intermediate nodes. The aim was to combine all 
available relevant information into the net. One problem, however, was to decide when to 
stop, i.e. how much details does one want to have in the BBN? 
The highest node in this figure is the producer quality. This is a hidden variable 
representing a fairly abstract quantity, which manifest itself through the variables it 
influences in adjacent nodes. The producer quality has a direct influence on the system 
quality, as indicated by an arrow. But this influence can also be seen indirectly, through the 
process by which the system is actually developed. This is shown by the edge to the node 
development process, which again has an edge to the node product quality. It has, 
however, also an edge leading to the node documentation. This should be interpreted such 
that the quality of the development process influences the quality of the documentation from 
the development. The latter is an observable, and one may put some kind of measures on the 
documentation quality. Evidences about the system quality are quality attributes such as 
readability, structuredness etc. These are grouped into one node called quality measures. 
This node could, however, be expanded further. 
Another edge from producer quality leads to the node QA policy. The arrow of the edge 
between them could be expressed as: a producer of high quality is likely to have a good 
Quality Assurance (QA) policy and use recommended development methods. The further 
argument is that a good QA policy implies that accepted QA standards are followed, and this 
can be observed. It also implies that a strict QA control is followed, and this may be 
observed through the QA control documentation, which is also observable. 
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The producer quality also has impact on the reliability of other products from the same 
producer. This again will clearly influence the number of failures observed in these products, 
which can be directly measured. However, the number of failures found in these products are 
clearly depending on the amount of user experience with these products, i.e. the more these 
products are used, the higher is the likelihood that any inherent faults in the product will be 
revealed through an observed failure. This user experience can be observed through user 
reports, which is an observable node. 
4.1 Computation on the BBN for system quality 
To demonstrate the computation on a larger BBN the BBN for system quality was selected. 
Notice that this was intended as an illustration of the method, and not as a real attempt to 
compute the quality of a system. The computations were based on discrete variables and the 
use of the HUGIN tool. 
The first step was to divide the variables associated with each node into discrete states. To 
limit the size of the problem, there was a maximum of three states for each variable. The 
states of the nodes were selected as given in table 2 in (Dahll and Gran 2000). The target 
node was selected to be the System Quality. The observable nodes were: Quality-control-
documents, QA-standards, Failures-in-other-products, Number-of-products, Usage-
time, Documentation and Quality-measures. All assignments of values to the variables 
and relation matrices were chosen somewhat ad hoc, i.e. reasonable for an illustration, but 
not based on any deeper analysis. The prior values for all the nodes are given in the appendix 
in (Dahll and Gran 2000). 
By placing findings on the Number-of-products, the pdfs for the User-experience, 
Usage time and Failures-in-other-prod. changed, but the findings had no effect on the 
rest of the variables. Similar observation was made for findings at Usage-time. This is in 
accordance with the conditional independences observed. By placing findings on the QA-
standards, the pdfs for the System quality changed somewhat, but not as much as when 
findings were placed on the Documentation and Quality-measures. This is in accordance 
with what one should expect, and also in accordance with the independence graph where e.g. 
the Quality-measures is directly connected to the System Quality. By placing findings 
on the Failures-in-other-products, the pdfs for the System Quality changed in opposite 
way as described above. This observation is not obvious by only observing the influence 
graph. 
The next step was to observe the BBN in the case of several findings at once. This was done 
in two cases, assuming all observable variables to be in their worst state and in their best 
state. The results did not show any unexpected results, except for the Producers pedigree 
which had approximately similar results in the two cases. 
4.2 Conclusions from computation on the BBN for system quality 
The evaluation of the test case showed how a finding on one or more specific observable 
variables would change the belief in a hidden explanatory variable such as the target node 
System Quality. The evaluation also showed the effect of conditional dependence and 
independence between variables. Further, the test case indicated that the HUGIN tool is 
suitable to be used in the calculations of a complete realistic test case. On the other hand, 
applying the BBN-methodology required that probability density functions were assigned for 
all variables, something that requires the use of expert judgement and collection of real data.  
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5 Standards and Guidelines for Safety Related Software 
Recently much effort has been taken to make international standards and guidelines for the 
development of programmable systems for safety related applications. A generic standard is 
IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related 
systems (IEC 61508). This standard will constitute a framework for other, more specific 
standards. Examples of branch specific standards are IEC-880 (IEC 880), IAEA software 
safety guide (IAEA ID NS 264) in the nuclear industry, and RTCA/DO-178B (1999) for 
safety critical software in civil aviation.  
A general impression from these standards is that they are built on the same basic 
framework, and follow the same principles, although they may differ in the aspects they put 
special emphasis on. The common framework is expressed in a software lifecycle model, 
where the different stages in the system development are placed. For each of these stages 
requirements or recommendations are given. The division into stages, and the starting and 
end stages of the lifecycle model, may differ between the standards. The standards also differ 
in the requirements they are particularly emphasising. Even if different standards vary in the 
degree of detail, a general characteristic of software standards is that the requirements and 
recommendations are of qualitative nature, in distinction from hardware standards where 
there in general are clear and objective requirements. Ideally a requirement in a standard 
should be objective in two ways: the requirement itself should be objective in an 
unambiguous way, and there should be an objective way to state whether the requirement is 
fulfilled or not. This problem is thoroughly discussed in (Neil and Fenton 1998).  
A question in connection with software safety standards is whether the fulfilment of their 
requirements actually guarantees that the system is safe. A standard is in general developed, 
over a long time period, by a group of experts. Other experts around the world then review 
the draft international standards. Such a thorough preparation by internationally renowned 
experts should strongly indicate that a system made according to this standard is safe. There 
is, however, no objective evidence that guarantees that this is true. Even the views of experts 
are to a large degree based on judgement. These judgements also need to be calibrated, 
which is an activity that dependents upon that the experts receive feedback on his/her 
judgement. In addition, the experts in this field constitute a fairly limited society, so it is 
likely that they are strongly influenced by each other.  
Of course, the safety assessment is not necessarily based on qualitative judgement only. 
There are analytical methods like e.g. fault tree analysis, reverse engineering, formal 
verification, etc., as well as statistical reliability evaluation based on operating experience or 
testing. Testing is essential for a safety assessment of the final product. A general impression 
is, however, that the standards are not very precise on required strategies for testing, but 
leave this to human judgement. 
A conclusion from these considerations is that it is not straightforward to decide objectively 
whether a software-based system is sufficiently safe on the basis of the criteria given in a 
standard only. There is a need for a systematic decision support system associated with a 
standard, which can help the licensing authority or any safety assessor. It is suggested that 
Bayesian Belief Nets and associated tools can provide this help (Gran 2002 Safety Science). 
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6 BBNs based upon RTCA/DO-178B (the “M-ADS project”) 
The attempt to combine the Bayesian Belief Nets methodology with the rules of a standard 
for safety critical software, RTCA/DO-178B (1999), hereafter referred to as DO-178B, was 
done in an experimental project carried out by a consortium composed of Kongsberg 
Defence & Aerospace AS (KDA), Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and the Halden Project (HRP). 
The project goal was to evaluate the use of BBN for investigating the implementation of the 
DO-178B standard for software approval in the commercials world. To reach that objectives 
a computerized system for automated transmission of graphical position information from 
helicopters to land based control stations (M-ADS) was selected and studied (Gran et. al. 
2000, Gran 2002a). Please note that references to the system developed by KDA and 
conclusions here represent by no means any official policy of KDA.  
6.1 RTCA/DO-178B 
The purpose of the DO-178B standard is to provide guidelines for the production of safety 
critical software for airborne systems. This guideline was chosen for the study since the M-
ADS system is applied in civil aviation, and was previously qualified on the basis of this 
standard. DO-178B discusses aspects of airworthiness certification pertaining to the 
production of software for airborne systems and equipment used in aircraft. To aid in 
understanding the certification process the system life cycle is briefly discussed to show 
relationship to the software life cycle process. DO-178B does not provide guidelines 
concerning the structure of the applicants organization, relations to suppliers and personnel 
qualification criteria. 
DO-178B defines a set of five software levels (A to E), based on the contribution from 
software to potential failure conditions as determined by the system safety assessment 
process. The main recommendations in DO-178B are given in a set of 10 tables, see table 1. 
Each table relates to a certain stage in the development and validation process, and contains 
a set of objectives. A difference between the DO-178B and e.g. IEC61508 is that most of the 
requirements are mandatory in the latter, while the requirements are guidelines in DO-178B 
(Neil and Fenton 1998). 
Table 1: The stages in the development and validation process given by DO-178B 
 Stage in the development and validation process 
A1 Software planning process. 
A2 Software development process. 
A3 Verification of outputs of software requirements process. 
A4 Verification of outputs of software design process. 
A5 Verification of outputs of software coding & integration process. 
A6 Testing of outputs of integration process. 
A7 Verification of verification process results. 
A8 Software configuration management process. 
A9 Software quality assurance process. 
A10 Certification liaison process. 
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6.2 The M-ADS Airborne Equipment 
The M-ADS airborne equipment was designed by KDA for installation in helicopter aircrafts 
(Gran et. al. 2000). The system provides air traffic services transmitting aircraft parameters 
upon request from the air traffic control where personnel will request positioning data. The 
M-ADS system is designed to automatically transmit flight information via data link to one 
or more requesting air control centres. M-ADS uses existing avionics on board the aircraft to 
provide aircraft position, speed and additional optional data. The most important data are the 
aircraft position, position accuracy, altitude and time stamp for the data validity. The main 
purpose of the M-ADS Airborne Equipment is to aid in a rescue operation if the helicopter 
has made an emergency landing on the sea. A correct localization is necessary for a 
successful rescue operation, the system is therefore safety critical, and the system had to be 
approved by the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority. The software development process 
was performed according to the DO-178B standard. 
6.3 The construction process 
The basic philosophy of the proposed process is to relate the safety of the system to the 
fulfilment of the requirements in an internationally accepted safety standard. This philosophy 
can of course be questioned, but such standards are based on consensus among experts in the 
area relevant for an actual safety critical system. Even if conformance to a safety standard 
does not imply safety, it is a strong indication of the effort put into making the system safe. 
This indication can also be used as prior probability in a Bayesian model for a further safety 
assessment based on safety testing. Recall that one want to achieve a way of stating how well 
the development of a safety critical system conforms to the requirements of the standard. 
However, such standards do not contain any measures of conformity, but rather a large 
number of requirements of rather disparate nature, which should be fulfilled. The objective 
of the M-ADS project was to use BBN methodology to construct such a measure. 
The first action in the construction is to identify the main characteristics that may influence 
the dependability of a system. One can distinguish between characteristics that are related to 
the system itself and characteristic that are related to the interaction between the system and 
its environment (usage of the system, potential hazards etc.). The former includes quality 
characteristics, which are divided into four types: 
•= Quality of the producer. (Qproducer) This includes the reputation and experience of the 
producer, quality assurance policy, quality of staff etc. 
•= Quality of the production process. (Qprocess) A high quality implies that the system is 
developed according to guidelines for good software engineering, that all phases are well 
documented, and that the documentation shows that the system at all development phases 
possesses desirable quality attributes as completeness, consistency, traceability etc. 
•= Quality of the product. (Qproduct) This includes quality attributes for the final product, as 
reliability, simplicity, verifiability etc. 
•= Quality of the analysis. (Qanalysis) This includes all activities performed to validate the 
correctness of the system during all stages of the system development. Such activities 
may include model checking of the specifications, inspections and walkthroughs of the 
documentation, static analysis of code and testing of the system. 
The next step is to construct the BBN in two levels. The higher level shows how nodes 
representing the four types of characteristics listed above are combined with other nodes in 
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the net and lead to nodes representing the reliability and safety of the system. At the lower 
level there are four BBNs, where the four characteristics are represented as top nodes.  
6.4 The higher-level BBN 
The higher-level network consists of two parts: the quality-part (or soft-evidence part) and 
the testing-part, as presented in Figure 3, (Gran 2002a).  
Figure 3: The higher-level network: the quality-part (or soft-evidence part) and the testing-part 
The quality-part consists of the four quality nodes listed in the previous section. In addition 
it includes the nodes problem complexity” and solution complexity”. The initial nodes or 
top nodes are the quality node Qproducer and the problem complexity, where the latter is an 
attribute of the system to be developed, and can be measured. It is assumed that the 
Qproducer directly influences the Qprocess, and that the solution complexity is influenced 
by the problem complexity and the Qprocess. The same dependencies are assumed for the 
Qproduct. The product quality depends upon how difficult it is to fulfil the requirements (the 
complexity of the problem), and upon the ability of the development process to handle 
complex systems. The Qanalysis is assumed to be influenced by the Qproducer, how well 
prepared the organization is to perform an analysis, and the solution complexity, how 
difficult it is to analyse. All these assumptions are based on the BBNs presented in the 
SERENE project and in accordance with networks for system quality (see chapter 5).  
The higher-level network leads to an end node N-hypothetical. The intention is to express 
that the information in the quality-part is equivalent to that the system is tested with N 
randomly chosen inputs without failure.  
The testing-part represented by the node P Y: failures in N new tests, describes the 
connection between hard evidences, Y=0 failures in N tests, and the failure probability of the 
system (in the context, usage, environment, etc. the system is tested). The failure probability 
can be interpreted either as a number of failures on a defined number of demands, or as a 
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N 
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number of failures on a defined time period. For the defined number of demands N with the 
constant failure probability P the random number of failures Y has a binomial distribution.  
The failure probability P can be linked to a node representing the system safety, which in 
addition is also depending on the usage of the system and the consequences of eventual 
failures. In the described project no modelling of the dependencies with respect to the system 
safety was made. Of this reason these nodes are not included in Figure 3, and no calculations 
related to this node were done.   
The link between the quality-part and the testing-part is given by the edge between N-
Hypothetical and P. The dependency associated with this edge, leading to the results 
presented, was given by P = 1/ N-Hypothetical”'. However, it was applied in the way that 
P(P∈[p,q]) = P(N-Hypothetical ∈[1/q,1/p]). The same dependency would have arisen by 
assuming direct dependencies between P and the nodes Qanalysis, Solution Complexity and 
QProduct. For the expert team it was, however, conceptual easier by this two-step procedure. 
An alternative BBN for the quality-part is to replace the node N-hypothetical with a node 
representing the P(failed state) directly, as presented in Figure 4 (Gran 2002b). This node 
is not to be viewed as a failure rate representing a specific usage or safety function, but 
rather as a deterministic property of the system expressing fault content. One interpretation is 
the size of the inherent faults in the software. Assuming that no failures are found or 
modifications are made during later testing of the system, this true failure rate is not 
changed; only the confidence in the reliability, or freeness of faults, of the program is 
enhanced. Thereby it also offers a support in the assessment of the software.  
 
Figure 4: The upper network for DO-178B 
6.5 The construction of BBNs on the lower level 
At the lower level there are four BBNs, one for each of the four quality aspects, with the 
quality aspects as top-nodes in the BBNs. Each top node is then linked to intermediate nodes 
representing the 10 lifecycle stages represented by the tables A1 to A10 of DO-178B. Each 
of these nodes are again linked to other intermediate nodes, representing the objectives of the 
tables. The four BBNs are presented in Appendix A. (Remark that these figures are the ones 
generated by the HUGIN tool, and contain misprints that are not corrected in accordance 
with the text in this report. The text in the nodes is also amputated due to the selection of the 
node size, which has to be equal for all nodes.) 
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The associating of the different objectives to the different quality aspects can be done by a 
group of experts, consisting of experts related to the standard itself, development in 
accordance with the standard, and experts within safety assessment of critical systems. In the 
M-ADS project each objective was identified to belong to one or more of the quality aspects. 
In addition a stage hmi-aspects representing objectives related to human-machine 
interfaces was added.  
The further proposed step is to identify a list of questions to each objective. In the M-ADS 
project these questions were based on the understanding of the text in the main part of DO-
178B, and formulated so that the answer could be given by a yes or a no. However, as 
the questions often are of a qualitative nature, it may be difficult to give a straight answer. It 
could therefore be possible to answer the question with a number between 0 and 1 as an 
expression of the strength in the belief that the answer is yes (1) or no (0). A list of the 
questions identified related to the quality of product for (A2) is presented in table 2. Figure 
5 presents the same example as a BBN. A list of all the questions constructed is given in the 
Appendix B. 
Table 2: The questions related to the lifecycle stage A2: software development process 
Objective Question: 
sw req. 
data  
Are all system functional requirements, safety requirements and auxiliary requirements 
specified in the software specification? 
Are all tasks specified in the requirements also included in the design? 
Does the design adequately describe the information flow between components? 
Does the design address sequencing, concurrency and time related information? 
Does the design adequately describe the data structures and their properties? 
Is it a clear separation in the design between safety critical and not safety critical parts of 
the system? 
Are measures for fault tolerance, like diversity or redundancy designed into the system? 
Are control and data flow monitored when safety requirements dictate, e.g. through 
watchdog timers, reasonableness checks, input data checks etc.? 
design 
descrip-
tion 
Are the responses to failure conditions consistent with safety related requirements? 
6.6 The elicitation of probability tables 
The elicitation of conditional probability tables (cpts) to the nodes and edges can be done as 
a brainstorming exercise by the expert group. In general, this means that for each node, the 
expert group has to assess two conditional probabilities of the type P(good measurement | 
good quality) and P(bad measurement | bad quality).  
The first probability is relatively easy to assess. Based on general knowledge and experience 
in software development and evaluation, it can be done by ranking the importance of the 
different sub nodes, giving them probabilities from a predefined set such as {0.5, 0.7. 0.9, 
0.95, 0.99}. The latter, however, can be very difficult. Often, where the experts state that 
there is a dependency between good quality and a specific good measurement, they cannot 
state the opposite effect.  
This was one of the lessons learned from the M-ADS project. Furthermore, also the approach 
of ranking the nodes had restricted success. Even if some of the project members can be 
considered as experts within their fields, it is, highly recommendable to make use of some 
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expert judgement tools or expert judgement expertise. For the lower-level network about 130 
conditional probability tables were assessed. The establishment of the BBNs and prior pdfs 
was rather time consuming, and would be even more so for a system. On the other hand, the 
generation of the BBNs was related to DO-178B and on safety assessment in general, and 
not to the actual system. This implies that the BBNs have a general nature, and can be reused 
in many applications. They can also be gradually improved based on experience. Note also 
that on the lower level, as illustrated in Figure 5, all nodes have only one parent. This makes 
the complexity of the BBNs manageable. In the case of nodes with more incoming edges, it 
would be a good solution to apply the approach suggested by Neil et al. (2000) 
Figure 5: Example of a list of questions associated with two of the objectives for the software 
development process related to the quality of analyses 
6.7 Results from the M-ADS project 
All the BBNs were implemented, and all the conditional probability tables were fed into the 
HUGIN and SERENE tools. This made it possible to make a variety of computations (Gran 
et al. 2000), with the aim to investigate different aspects of the methodology, such as:  
•= What is the effect of observations during only one lifecycle process?  
•= How does the result change by subsequent inclusion of observations from the lifecycle 
processes?  
•= How sensitive is the result to changes in individual observations? 
Since the number of possible scenarios is exploding when one wants to explore both 
different sets of observations and prior cpts, a limited number of computations were made. 
However, an interesting observation was that we rapidly found surprising results that 
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required further discussion and calculations. These results provided a list of topics for further 
research, both with respect to topological issues and with respect to different cases of 
observations.  
The observations were done by KDA through several interview sessions with experts 
involved in the project. Totally, experts representing the software design and coding role, as 
well as project management role, were involved. In each session the questions associated 
with the end nodes in the network were used to assess the module in view of the scope 
defined by the node. The answers were, as discussed in section 6.5, given as weighted values 
on the scale from zero to one. In general the value zero (0) means objective achieved with 
poor quality, while the value one (1) means objective achieved at highest level of quality. 
There also were a few cases where a score, say 0.95, indicated objective achieved at highest 
level of quality for 95% of the modules. As an example refer to a question for the BBN for 
Qanalysis: is the software quality assurance process properly performed and recorded? 
The answer, 0.95, means that the expert board judged that software quality assurance process 
is properly performed and recorded for 95% of the modules. 
6.7.1 The partial scenarios results 
In addition to surprising results, this research demonstrated the importance of a good quality 
assurance of the observations entered into a BBN. The trigging event was the discovery of a 
wrong entered observation. Correcting this error demonstrated that one negative observations 
can have a significant effect on a partial results. By using the wrong observations it was 
concluded that there were effects with respect to the different quality aspects, and in 
particular with respect to the node Qproducer (Gran et al. 2000, Gran 2002a). After 
correcting this error, the effect of the observations during only one stage in the development 
and validation process showed that the effects, with respect to QProducer, were 
approximately the same for all the processes (Gran 2001). The evaluation also showed that 
the one wrong (negative) observation, as well as a set of a few negative observations, is not 
enough to change the overall results. 
6.7.2 The incremental scenarios 
The observations could also be added subsequently, first during process A1, then A2 and so 
on (Gran et al. 2000, Gran 2002a). This illustrates how the posterior probability distributions 
change from the initial prior values towards a scenario given by all the KDA observations. 
For the Qproducer the expected value came up to a top level already after observations 
during processes A1 and A2 were made. This does not mean that the quality of the producer 
will remain on this level independent of other additional observations, but means that 
making additional good observations does not change our posterior results. With respect to 
the nodes Qprocess, Qproduct, and Qanalysis we had to make positive observations on all 
the processes A1 towards A8 before the posterior probability distributions achieved the top 
level. For the node P, the posterior distribution was at its top level after observations were 
made during process A1 up to A3. This is the similar effect as for the Qproducer. Note that, 
although there is no direct link between these two nodes, they behave in the same manner 
due to the propagation of positive measurements. 
6.7.3 Sensitivity cases 
A sensitivity analysis was performed for the node P given future observations on the node N 
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(new tests) (Gran et al. 2000, Gran 2002a). That is, with all the observations on the quality 
characteristics, represented in the node N_hypothetical, different measurements were made 
on the node N. Note that making a measurement equal to m assumes that a failure occurred 
after m failure free tests. The posterior probability distributions for P are shown in Figure 6. 
Compared to testing alone, these results show that observing m failure free tests, where m is 
higher than the hypothetical N failure free tests, will increase our belief in a shift left of the 
distribution for P. In the same way, observing m lower than N will shift it right, due to the 
situation that our prior belief is not in accordance with the real measurements. 
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Figure 6. The posterior probability distribution for P for different number of new tests 
6.7.4 The effect of one negative and one “not positive” observation 
As stated for the partial scenario it was discovered that one observation, with respect to 
process A4, was given the value zero. This value corresponds to a negative answer to the 
question Is the software partitioning integrity confirmed? However, whether this answer 
was meant to be negative; i.e. that this question is of importance to the reliability of the 
product, or if this question was ranked as irrelevant, was not further discussed. In the latter 
case it would have been better not to give any value to this observable node at all. This is 
equivalent to cutting the edge to this node. A further walk-through of the observations also 
identified that 6 questions, which belong to two or more of the quality aspect networks, were 
given different observations in the different sub-networks (Gran 2001). Of these 6 questions, 
one belonged to the process A10, and was given a very low score for the Qproduct. For the 
other divergences, the differences were smaller.   
The result of correcting these faults was that the surprising low effect for A4 and A10 
disappeared. And, the processes with low effect were now observed to be A1 and A8. These 
were both also identified as contributors to low effect for the other quality aspects. 
On the other hand, if one assumes that the questions should have been non-identical, and that 
the observations on these in fact were negative or low as entered, then we have identified a 
case where only two negative observations can lead to negative significant changes in the 
partial scenarios. 
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6.7.5 The effect of some negative observations 
The latter result is related to the fact that the observations applied in the project were in 
general positive. An open question is therefore: what would be the result if more 
observations were negative? In particular, what are the overall results after entering 
observations in all phases? And, is it possible to find a set of negative observations that 
belong to all or more phases? The reason for the latter is that it is very little realistic to have 
good observation within 9 phases, and negative observations within the others. More realistic 
is that the negative observations are distributed over all phases. 
An attempt to find such set of observations (out of a total of 71 observations) was to look 
into the set of observations (19 observations) that is related to two or three processes (Gran 
2001). These 19 observations can be divided into 5 groups as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3:  The 5 groups of observations related to more quality aspects 
Group Related to quality aspect: Processes: 
1 QProduct, Qananlysis A4, A5, A7, other 
2 QProcess, Qananlysis A1, A2, A6 
3 QProduct, QProcess A5, A6 
4 QProduct, QProcess, QProducer A9, A10 
5 QProduct, QProcess, Qananlysis A3, A5 
 
By entering negative observations to the questions related to the three groups we observed 
the effects as shown in Table 4 (Gran 2001). Remark that all the other observations are held 
positive, and the effect of change is observed related to as observed by KDA, that is more 
or less all positive. As shown in the table, we see that there was only a significant effect on 
the Qproducer. That means that we by entering negative observations on the two questions 
related to processes A9 and A10, we achieve a lower confidence in good quality of the 
producer. 
Table 4:  The effect of negative observations related to the questions from the groups 1-5. 
Gr. Observed Effect 
1 Minor effect to QProduct and Qananlysis 
2 Minor effect on QProcess, no effect on Qananlysis 
3 Minor effect on QProcess, no effect on QProduct 
4 No effect on QProduct, minor effect on QProcess, but significant effect on 
QProducer 
5 No effect on QProduct, minor effect on QProcess, and no effect on Qananlysis 
6.7.6 The effect of 19 negative observations 
Based on the results presented above, the next scenario was to enter a negative observation 
on all the questions related to all the groups presented in Table 3. This had a significant 
effect on all the quality aspects, and also the node P(failure state)as shown in Table 5 and 
Table 6. An issue for further investigation is to look the combinations of these 19 to see how 
the results turn from positive towards negative. 
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Table 5:  The effect of 19 negative observations on the node QProducer. 
Scenario good=5 4 3 2 bad=1 
KDA original1 0.145 0.782 0.070 8E-6 6E-8 
KDA corrected2 0.184 0.804 0.011 1E-6 1E-8 
19 negative 0.018 0.359 0.621 0.01 1E-6 
(1) with wrong observation, (2) after corrections  
Table 6: The effect of 19 negative obs. on the nodes Qprocess, Qproduct and Qanalysis. 
Process Product Analysis Scenario 
good bad good bad good bad 
KDA original1 1.0 4E-7 1.0 3E-9 1.0 1E-9 
KDA corrected2 1.0 2E-7 1.0 1E-10 1.0 1E-9 
19 negative 0.039 0.961 0.117 0.883 0.993 0.007 
(1) with wrong observation, (2) after corrections  
6.7.7 Discussion of the results 
One other observation from the results from the incremental scenario is that they reached 
stable maxims very fast. This indicates that the activities in the later stages in the 
development and validation process have little effect. Similarly, the partial results are almost 
as good as complete results. These results are not expected.  
One possible explanation is that a good score in one table is an indication of high quality 
during all phases, so that there also should be high scores in other tables. Another 
explanation is that 19 questions are repeated in two or three tables. However, these two 
explanations are not necessarily different. The latter can be a way to use the BBN topology 
to express the first explanation; i.e. that certain types of observations are relevant for several 
of the development phases associated with the tables. 
6.7.8 The difference in partial results for A4 and A5 
A third observation from the project was obtained by comparing the partial results from the 
lifecycle processes verification of outputs of software design processes (A4) and 
verification of outputs of software coding and integration process (A5). The good score 
for these are the same for the quality aspects producer and analysis, but A5 scores better 
on process and in particular on product. To explain this difference, the differences in 
BBN topology, in the cpts, and in the observations are investigated (Gran 2001).  
The investigation showed related to the partial results for the processes A4 and A5, that we 
have the effects of both neutralizing, conformity, enlargement and the effect of the 
observations alone, see details in Table 7.  
The comparison of the results for A4 and A5 can also explain the difficulty of finding a 
subset of observations that turns the results negative. Accordingly we shall expect problems 
with finding a subset of positive observations leading to stable maxims.  
These results also indicate the problems of performing a verification of a Bayesian Belief 
Network. The reason is that two different groups of experts can come up with two different 
 page 24 of 45 
BBNs. If one then enters somehow different observations into these networks, there is a 
good chance of observing the same results for the target nodes. On the other hand, these 
results also point in the direction that two different BBNs should be based up on the same 
observations. This again is an argument in favour of the BBN-construction process applied: 
each objective in the guideline associated to a list of questions. 
Table 7:  The partial results for the processes A4 and A5. 
Quality 
aspect 
Observed 
difference in 
A4 and A5 
Difference in 
topology 
Difference 
in 
observations
Effect of observations and 
topology (A4 vs. A5) 
Producer A4 = A5 differences in the cpts 
different 
observations neutralize each other 
Analyses A4 = A5 different number of questions 
no large 
differences conformity, i.e. A4 = A5 
Process A4 ! A5 differences in the cpts and topology
different 
observations
topology and observations pull 
in same direction (enlargement) 
Product A4 !! A5 different number of questions 
different 
observations
although a different number of 
questions, the observations 
alone give the difference 
6.8 Discussion of the M-ADS results 
The research conducted addresses some of the observations pinpointed as interesting, strange 
or counter-intuitive in the project on combining the Bayesian Belief Nets technology with 
the rules of a standard for safety critical software, DO-178B for a real, safety related, 
programmable system. One results is the importance of a good quality assurance of the 
observations entered into a BBN. One the other hand, it also demonstrates that one negative 
observations can have a significant effect on a partial results. The evaluation has also showed 
that one negative observation, or a set of a few negative observations is not enough to change 
the overall results.  
The results also show that there can be a rapid change in the overall results, given a specific 
order of turning the observations. This work indicates that this change takes place 
somewhere in the middle of negative observations on a few repeated questions and 
negative observations on all repeated questions. A further evaluation can give more 
specific results. However, the evaluation has also showed that there is an effect of the 
combination of topology, cpts and observations. A pinpointed set of observations could 
therefore change by a change in the topology or a conditional probability table. 
Finally the evaluation points on some of the problems that one will be faced with wanting to 
perform a validation or verification of the BBN. One hypothesis is that the use of 
questionnaires can be a vital point.  
7 Extending the BBNs based upon RTCA/DO-178B 
Within the nuclear field there is an increased focus on risk-based regulation of nuclear power 
plants. This is in accordance with the new generic guideline for programmable safety related 
systems, IEC-61508 (2000), where probabilistic safety integrity levels are given as 
requirements for safe operation. Therefore, there is a need to establish methods to assess the 
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reliability of programmable systems, including the software. One approach in this research is 
an on-going long-term joint research activity between the Halden Project (HRP) and VTT 
Automation (VTT) in Finland (Gran and Helminen 2001, Gran 2002b). One objective of this 
co-operative project is to investigate how a network, representing the software safety 
guideline and different quality aspects, as described in the previous chapter, can be merged 
with a network, developed by VTT, representing evidence from disparate operational 
environments (Helminen 2000).  
7.1 The VTT approach 
The main sources of reliability evidence in the case of safety critical systems considered in 
the VTT approach are depicted in Figure 7 (Neil et. al 1996a). A similar version of this 
model has been presented by Stålhane et al. (1993). Part of the evidence, such as the 
evidence obtained through operational experience and testing, may be directly measurable 
statistical evidence. Part of the evidence, such as the design features and the development 
process of the system, may be qualitative characterization of the system. 
Figure 7: Main sources of reliability evidence in a case of safety critical system 
The qualitative characterization of the design features and the development process follows 
certain quality assurance and quality control principles, which are based on applicable 
standards. Running a good development process alone does not guarantee a more reliable 
product. However, the more strict standards the characterizations fulfil, combined with good 
testing results, the more confidence one will become in having a reliable system. The 
evidence based on qualitative characterization can be considered as soft evidence, while 
evidence obtained from operational experience and testing can be considered as hard 
evidence. The exploitation of soft evidence in the reliability analysis of software-based 
system requires extensive use of expert judgment making it quite an unforeseeable matter 
and therefore the VTT approach is mainly focused to the utilization of hard evidence 
(Helminen 2000). 
The reliability of a software-based system is modelled as a failure probability parameter, 
which reflects the probability that the automation system does not operate when demanded. 
Information for the estimation of the failure probability parameter can be obtained from the 
disparate sources of hard and soft evidence. To obtain the best possible estimate for the 
failure probability parameter of the target system all evidence should to be combined.  
The principle idea of the estimation method is to build a priori estimate for the failure 
probability parameter of software-based system using the soft and hard evidence obtained 
from the system development process, pre-testing and evaluating system design features 
while system is produced, but before it is deployed. The prior estimation is then updated to a 
Operational Experience 
Development Process Design Features 
Testing 
System Reliability
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posterior estimate using the hard evidence obtained from testing after the system is deployed 
and from operational experience while the system is operational. The difference between 
disparate evidence sources can be taken care in the structural modelling of the Bayesian 
Network model.  
To analyse the applicability of Bayesian Networks to the reliability estimation of software-
based systems Bayesian Network models for safety critical systems are built. The different 
models are distinguished by the evidence, which is collected from different systems and 
from different operational profiles. The Bayesian Network shown in the left-low part of 
Figure 8 describes a system, for which the observed number of failures Y is binomial 
distributed with parameters N and P. The parameter N describes the number of demands in 
the single test cycle and parameter P is the random failure probability parameter. To increase 
the flexibility of the model depicted in the left part, a logit-transformed P parameter " is 
included into the network, and the network becomes as shown to left in Figure 8.  
Figure 8: The VTT-model for two operational profiles 
Often the system is tested with different operational profiles under different operational 
environments. The results from applying the different operational profiles provide different 
failure probabilities for the same system. However, the failure probability from testing gives 
us some information about the failure probability of the system functioning in a different 
operational profile than where the testing was made. This evidence provided by testing is 
valuable and one should make a good use of it by taking into account the difference in the 
operational profiles when building the model. Helminen (2000) solve the problem of 
different operational profiles by connecting the binomial distributed evidence from different 
operational profiles to separate failure probability parameters. The Bayesian Network 
representing the case is illustrated as the whole of Figure 8.  
7.2 Merging the HRP approach and the VTT approach 
The merging of the two approaches is based on the on the network presented in Figure 4 (the 
higher level) and the left part of the network shown in Figure 8. The merged network is 
displayed in Figure 9 (Gran and Helminen 2001). The merging is done by replacing the node 
P(failure state) by the node "priori.  
 
P 
Y 
N P* 
Y* 
N* 
Θ  
Θ* 
Ω* 
µ* σ* 
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Figure 9: The merged network from the VTT and HRP approaches 
7.3 Results from applying the merged BBN 
Each of the quality aspect nodes was connected to quality aspects, as described in section 6. 
That allowed us to directly insert the observations from the M-ADS evaluation in the 
network. In addition the conditional probability tables for P(failure state) ware transformed 
into continuous normal distributions. For the merged network we performed calculations for 
the case of no M-ADS observations and for the case with the M-ADS observations, 
running from N=100 to N=1000000.  
For both scenarios the target was the node for the failure probability. In Figure 10 both the 
median and the 97.5% percentile posterior distribution values for P on the logarithmic scale 
are shown. The values for N=1, are the values representing the prior distributions, i.e. before 
starting the testing (and observing Y=0). Remark that the curves for the 97.5% percentiles 
are somewhat bumpy. This due to the fact, that the values are deduced from posterior 
histograms. 
7.4 Experiences from merging the BBNs 
The main differences between the two studies lie in the difference of focus areas. The work 
by VTT mainly focuses to studying explicitly the influence of prior distributions to the 
reliability estimation and to the investigation of combining statistical evidence from 
disparate operational environments. The work described in this thesis focuses mainly on how 
to model a software safety guideline, DO-178B, and how to combine soft evidences in the 
safety assessment of a programmable system. The key idea is to split the larger entities of 
soft evidence into smaller quantities. Another difference is the comprehensive usage of 
continuous distributions in the VTT work, which is somewhat a different approach than the 
approach used in the BBNs for the DO-178B. This is however not discussed in this work.  
The merged networks show how the two approaches can be merged. It gives an extended 
description of the quality aspects, originally modelled by the node " in the VTT approach, 
and it shows how different operational profiles, can be included in the approach described.  
Solution Complexity 
Problem complexity Qproces
Qproduct 
Qproducer 
Qanalyses 
Y: failures in N ... 
" priori
P N
"
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Figure 10:  Median and 97.5% percentile posterior distribution values for P on the logarithmic scale, 
for the scenario of no observations and the scenario with the observations 
8 Conclusions  
The objective of the research has been to investigate the possibility to transfer the 
requirements of a software safety standard into Bayesian belief networks (BBNs). The BBN 
methodology has mainly been developed and applied in the AI society, but more recently it 
has been proposed to apply it to the assessment of programmable systems. The relation to AI 
application is relevant in the sense that the method reflects the way of an assessors thinking 
during the assessment process. Conceptually, software reliability is almost impossible to 
compute, since many of the aspects of the software which influence the reliability are of 
qualitative nature and not directly measurable, but have to be estimated e.g. by expert 
judgement. 
The conclusion from the research presented in this thesis is that the use of Bayesian Belief 
Networks for combining disparate sources of information in the safety assessment of 
software based systems, combined with questionnaires, offers a systematic way to combine 
quantitative and qualitative evidences of relevance for the safety assessment of 
programmable systems, e.g. in a licensing process or in a PSA analysis. 
The BBN is constructed in two levels. The higher level is based on the four qualities: quality 
of the producer, quality of the production, quality of the product, and quality of the analysis. 
The higher-level BBN is general, and independent of the standard, and is based on the 
research discussed in chapter 2. The lower-level BBNs reflect the recommendations of 
RTCA/DO-178B. Each top node of the lower-level BBNs is linked to intermediate nodes 
representing the 10 lifecycle stages identified in DO-178B. Each of these nodes are again 
linked to other intermediate nodes, representing the objectives of each lifecycle. The further 
proposed step is to identify a list of questions to each objective. In the described research 
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these questions are based on the understanding of the text in the main part of DO-178B, and 
formulated so that the answer could be given by a yes or a no. 
For both the higher and lower level networks there is a need for further validation. This is 
demonstrated through the experimental investigation with the BBNs. However, a hypothesis 
is that a reallocation of objectives or questions only will give local (or partial) effects, and 
not changes in the overall assessment. A reason for this could be that there are a few soft 
evidences and dependencies connecting these evidences that are more sensitive than the 
other. So fare, there has, however, not been possible to find such evidences. 
Although the BBNs and results are based upon a real application, this approach has not been 
applied to a real development or assessment. A first try could be to apply the approach for 
decision support in the approval of safety critical programmable systems. Another try could 
be to apply the approach as decision support early in the development of a system, in order 
to point on where to set in the effort and thus being able to reach specific objectives of the 
final product. 
The establishment of the BBNs and prior probability distributions can be rather time 
consuming. However, the process of building up the network, e.g. by making questionnaires, 
and doing the elicitation of the prior distributions related to a standard (RTCA/DO-178B), 
and not to the actual system, implies that the network and questions are of a general nature, 
and can be reused in many applications. They can also be gradually improved based on 
experience. The experiences with modelling the requirements of the avionics standard 
RTCA/DO-178B as BBNs, point in the direction that this approach can be transferred to the 
modelling of other software standards built on the same basic framework, and which follow 
the same principles. This holds even though they may differ in the aspect they put special 
emphasis on. 
Conceptually, estimation of the dependability of programmable systems is nearly impossible 
to compute, since many of the characteristics to be considered are of qualitative nature and 
not directly measurable, but have to be estimated. The most difficult activity in the 
experiment described was to perform the expert judgment, in particular in the assignment of 
values to the conditional probability distributions. Even if some of the project members can 
be considered as experts within their fields, it is highly recommendable to make use of some 
expert judgment tools or expert judgment expertise. Note also that knowledge within BBN 
and probabilistic theory is of great advantage in the construction of the networks and the 
assessment of the probability distributions, and also an advantage in the evaluation of the 
results from the computations. 
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APPENDIX A: The lower-level BBNs 
A7: Has the producer long practice in software V&V activities?
Qproducer_A8 - sw CMP
Qproducer_A10 - certification liasion process
Qproducer_A7 - vv of verification process results
Qproducer_A9 - SQA Process
A7: Has the producer an acceptable V&V philosophy?
A7: Has the producer sufficient and qualified resources for V&V?
Is the software quality assurance process properly performed and recorded
Are all software configuration management activities recorded in the Softw
cert_feed_obs
Qproducer_A5- vv of sw coding & integartion process
A2 producer experience
Qproducer_A4- vv of sw design process
Qproducer_A2 - sw development process
Qproducer_A3 - vv of sw req. process
Qproducer_A1 - sw planning
Quality of producer
A1-11.6 sw req. standards
A1-11.7 sw design standards
A1-11.8 sw code standards
A2 Are other products made by the producer reliable andof high quality
 
Figure A-1: The BBN for Quality of producer 
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A1-11.4 Are there acceptable configuration manage
A1-11.2 Is the sw_development_plan complete?
A1-11.3 Is the sw verification plan complete with re
A1-11.5 SQA-Records
A2-11.9 Are all system functional requirements, safe
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APPENDIX B: The questions related to DO-178B 
Questionnaires for “Quality of Producer”: 
Node/table reference Question 
Quality_Producer  
 Qproducer_sw_plan_process/ A1  
  sw_req_standards/ A1-11.6 Does the producer follow software requirement standards? 
  sw_design_standards/ A1-11.7 Does the producer follow software design standards? 
  sw_code_standards/ A1-11.8 Does the producer follow software coding standards? 
 Qproducer_sw_dev_process/ A2  
  producer_experience/ A2 Has the producer long experience in making similar systems? 
  Producer pedigree Are other products made by the producer reliable and of high quality?
 Qproducer_vv_sw_req_process/ A3  
  hl_vs_standards/ A3-5 Do the high-level requirements conform to the producer’s standard? 
 Qproducer_vv_sw_design_process/ A4  
  sw_arch_standards/ A4-12 Do the software architecture conform to the producer’s design 
standard? 
 Qproducer_vv_sw_coding_process/ A5  
  code_traceable_ll/ A5-5 Is it a clear correspondence between each element of the design and 
corresponding code modules? 
 Qproducer_vv_vv_process/ A7  
  vv_resources/ A7 Has the producer sufficient and qualified resources for V&V? 
  vv_philosophy/ A7 Has the producer an acceptable V&V philosophy? 
  vv_in_practice/ A7 Has the producer long practice in software V&V activities? 
 Qproducer_sw_CMP/ A8  
  CMP_exists_used/ A8 Are all software configuration management activities recorded in the 
Software Configuration Records? 
 Qproducer_SQAP/ A9  
  sqa_in_practice/ A9 Is the software quality assurance process properly performed and 
recorded? 
 Qproducer_cl_process/ A10  
  certification_feedback/ A10 Have Human-System Interaction aspects been properly considered 
during the development of the system? 
Questionnaires for “Quality of Production process”: 
Node/table reference Question 
Quality_Process  
 Qprocess_sw_plan_process  
  sw_development_plan /A1-11.2 Is the sw_development_plan complete?: 
o Are all future phases in the system lifecycle included in the plans?
o Are standards for all phases in the system lifecycle included in 
the plans? 
o Have software development environments been chosen? 
  Sw_verification_plan/A1-11.3 Is the sw verification plan complete with respect to: 
o Organisation 
o Independence 
o Verification methods 
o Transition criteria for entering the verification process into the 
plan 
o Partitioning considerations 
o Assumptions on compiler, linker, etc. 
o Reverification 
o COTS 
o N-version software if applied 
  SCM_plan/A1-11.4 Are there acceptable configuration management plans for all phases? 
o Proper organisational structure? 
o Proper procedure for identification of items? 
o Acceptable procedure for secures storage? 
o Change control procedures acceptable? 
o Good revision control? 
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  SQA_records/ A1-11.5 Does overall software quality assurance plans exist for all phases? 
Are there: 
o Qualification routines for software systems 
o QA document for managing software projects 
o Qualification of vendors 
o QA in project management 
 Qprocess_sw_dev_process  
  sw_req_data/A2-11.9 Are all system functional requirements, safety requirements and 
auxiliary requirements specified in the software specification? 
  design_description/A2-11.10 
 
o Are all tasks specified in the requirements also included in the 
design? 
o Does the design adequately describe the information flow between 
components? 
o Does the design address sequencing, concurrency and time related 
information? 
o Does the design adequately describe the data structures and their 
properties? 
o Is there a clear separation in the design between safety critical 
and not safety critical parts of the system? 
o Are measures for fault tolerance, like diversity or redundancy 
designed into the system? 
o Are control and data flow monitored when safety requirements 
dictate, e.g. through watchdog timers, reasonableness checks, 
input data checks, etc.? 
o Are the responses to failure conditions consistent with safety 
related requirements? 
 Qprocess_vv_sw_req_process  
  hl_req_acurate/A3-2 Is the high level requirement specification correct, unique and 
consistent? 
  hl_req_traceable/A2-11.9 Is tracability between the high level requirement and the final 
product facilitated?  
 Qprocess_vv_sw_design_process  
  ll_req_acurate/A4-2 ll Is the design documents a correct and consistent refinement of the 
high level requirements? 
  ll_req_ttraceable/A4-6 ll Is there a clear correspondence between each item of the high level 
requirements and corresponding elements of the design? 
  sw_arch_consistent/A4-9 Has an analysis shown that the software architecture does not 
contain any internal inconsistencies? 
 Qprocess_vv_sw_coding_process  
  code_vs_ll_req/A5-1 Is the code a correct and consistent refinement of the low-level 
requirements given in design documents? 
  code_traceable_ll/A5-5 Is there a clear correspondence between each element of the design 
and corresponding code modules? 
 Qprocess_test_int_process/ A6  
  vv_cases_procedures/A6 11-13 Which types of tests have been performed on the system? 
o Hardware/software integration testing 
o Software integration testing 
o Low level testing 
Which types of test data selection strategies have been used 
o Simulation testing  
o Coverage test 
o Black box tests  
o White box  tests  
o Stress tests  
  vv_cases_procedures_1/A6 11-14 o Have all specified functions been tested? 
o Have all specified safety actions been tested? 
o Has fault injection been used to test the robustness of the system 
sw verification cases and procedures? 
 Qprocess_sw_CMP  
  SLC_env_config_index/A8 11-15 Are all tools used to produce the software, in all life cycle phases, 
identified, controlled and retrievable? 
  sw_configuration/ A8 11-16 Is a software product baseline established and placed in a Software 
Configuration Index? 
 Qprocess_SQAP  
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  sqa_exists/ A9 Is the software quality assurance process properly performed and 
recorded?  
 Qprocess_cl_process  
  certification_feedback/ A10 Has the development been made in co-ordination with, and with 
feedback from, the certification authorities? 
 mmi_aspects Have Human-System Interaction aspects been properly considered 
during the development of the system? 
Questionnaires for “Quality of Product”: 
Node/table reference Question 
Quality_Product  
 Qproduct_sw_plan_process  
  plan_sw_certification/A1-11.1 Is the system made according to a plan which includes software 
certification aspects? 
  sw_verification_plan/ A1-11.3 Is the system made according to a plan which includes software 
verification aspects? 
 Qproduct_sw_dev_process  
  source_code/ A2-11.11 Does the source code possess the following properties?: 
o Correct implementation of all low-level requirements 
o Consistency 
o Verifiability 
o Tracability 
  ex_obj_code/ A2-11.12 o Is the executable object code correct?: 
o Is the translation of the source code into executable code made in 
a trustworthy way? 
o Is the implementation of the executable code onto the target 
computer made correctly? 
 Qproduct_vv_sw_req_process A3  
  sw_hl_vs_system_req/ A3-1 Do the software high level requirements comply with system 
requirements? 
  hl_req_accurate/ A3-2 Is the high-level requirement specification correct, unique and 
consistent? 
  hl_req_target_computer/ A3-3 Has the executable code been verified on the target computer? 
  algorithm_accurate/ A3-7 Have all algorithms used in the program been verified with respect to 
accuracy and correctness? 
 Qproduct_vv_sw_design_process/  A4  
  ll_req_vs_hl_req/ A4-1 ll Do the low-level requirements (design documents) comply with the 
high level requirements? 
  ll_req_acurate/ A4-2 ll Are the low-level requirements accurate and consistent? 
  ll_req_target_computer/ A4-3  Are there any conflicts between the low-level requirements and the 
hardware/software features of the target computer? 
  alg_accurate/ A4-7 Have all algorithms used in the program been verified with respect to 
accuracy and correctness? 
  sw_arch_hl_req/ A4-8 Is the software architecture compatible with high level requirements?
  sw_arch_consistent/ A4-9 Has an analysis shown that the software architecture does not 
contain any internal inconsistencies? 
  sw_partitoning_int_confirmed/ A4-13 Is the software partitioning integrity confirmed? 
 Qproduct_vv_sw_coding_process  
  code_sw_arch/ A5-2 Does the source code match the data- and control flow defined in the 
software architecture? 
  code_traceable_ll_1/ A5-5 Is there a clear correspondence between each element of the design 
and corresponding code modules? 
  code_accurate_consistent/ A5-6 Is it verified that the code is accurate and consistent, also including 
the attributes: 
o Stack usage 
o Fixed point arithmetic overflow and resolution 
o Resource contention 
o Worst case execution timing 
o Exception handling 
o Use of uninitialised variables or constants 
o Unused variables or constants 
o Data corruption due to task or interrupt conflicts 
  code_vs_ll_req/ A5-1 Is the code a correct and consistent refinement of the low-level 
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requirements given in design documents? 
 Qproduct_test_int_process/ A6  
 
 
 vv_cases_procedures/A6 11-13 Which types of tests have been performed on the system? 
o Hardware/software integration testing 
o Software integration testing 
o Low level testing 
Which types of test data selection strategies have been used? 
o Simulation testing  
o Coverage test 
o Black box tests  
o White box  tests  
o Stress tests  
 Qproduct_vv_vv_process - tests/ A7  
  Test procedure /A7-1 o Is the test performed correctly? 
o Does the test reflect the actual usage of the final system? 
o Is the ‘oracle’ correct? 
  Test results/A7-2 Are all test results correct, or if not, are the discrepancies explained? 
  Test completeness o Have all specified functions been tested? 
o Have all specified safety actions been tested? 
o Has fault injection been used to test the robustness of the system 
sw verification cases and procedures? 
  Test coverage/ A7-3 - 8 Does the test cover 
o High-level requirements  
o Low-level requirements 
o All software structures 
o All decisions 
o All branches 
 Qproduct_sw_CMP/ A8  
  SCM_records/ A8 C11-18 Are all software configuration management activities recorded in the 
Software Configuration Records? 
 Qproduct_SQAP/ A9  
  sqa_in_practice Is the software quality assurance process properly performed and 
recorded?  
  Software conformity Does the software development conform to the SQA requirements? 
 Qproduct_cl_process/ A10  
  certification_feedback Has the development been made in co-ordination with, and with 
feedback from, the certification authorities? 
 Qproduct_sw_metrics If any type of software measurement has been performed, what is the 
result?  
 Qproduct_COTS If the quality of all COTS used in the system has been evaluated, 
what is the result? 
 mmi_aspects Have Human-System Interaction aspects been properly considered 
during the development of the system? 
Questionnaires for “Quality of Analysis”: 
Node/table reference Question 
Quality_Analyses  
 Qanalysis_sw_plan_process/ A1  
  sw_verification_plan/ A1-11.3 Is the system made according to a plan which includes software 
certification aspects? 
  SQA_plan/ A1-11.5 Is the system made according to a plan which includes software 
verification aspects? 
  sw_verification_results/ A1-11.14  
 Qanalysis_sw_dev_process/ A2  
  sw_req_data/ A2-11.9 Does the source code possess the following properties?: 
o Correct implementation of all low-level requirements 
o Consistency 
o Verifiability 
o Tracability 
  source_code/ A2-11.11 o Is the executable object code correct?: 
o Is the translation of the source code into executable code made in 
a trustworthy way? 
o Is the implementation of the executable code onto the target 
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computer made correctly? 
  ex_object_code/ A2-11.12  
 Qanalysis_vv_sw_req_process/A-3  
  hl_req_accurat/ A3-2e Is the high-level requirement specification correct unique and 
consistent? 
  hl_req_target_computer/A3-3 Has the executable code been verified on the target computer? 
  hl_req_verifiable/ A3-4 Is the high-level requirement verifiable? 
 Qanalysis_vv_sw_design_process  
  ll_req_acurate/ A4-2 Are the low-level requirements accurate and consistent? 
  ll_req_target_computer/ A4-3 Are there any conflicts between the low-level requirements and the 
hardware/software features of the target computer? 
  ll_req_verifiable/ A4-4 Is the high-level requirement verifiable. 
  sw_arch_hl_req/ A4-8 Is the software architecture compatible with high level requirements?
  sw_arch_consistent/ A4-9 Has an analysis shown that the software architecture does not 
contain any internal inconsistencies? 
  sw_arch_target_computer/A4-11 Are there any conflicts between the software architecture and the 
hardware/software features of the target computer? 
  sw_partitoning_int_confirmed/ A4-13 Is the software architecture verifiable? 
 Qanalysis_vv_sw_coding_process/ A5  
  code_sw_arch/ A5-2 Does the source code match the data- and control flow defined in the 
software architecture? 
  code_verifiable/ A5-3 Is the source code verifiable? 
  code_standards/ A5-4 Does the code conform to the coding standard? 
  code_traceable_ll/ A5-5 Is there a clear correspondence between each element of the design 
and corresponding code modules? 
 Qanalysis_test_int_process/ A6  
  vv_cases_procedures/ A6 11-13 Which types of tests have been performed on the system? 
o Hardware/software integration testing 
o Software integration testing 
o Low level testing 
Which types of test data selection strategies have been used? 
o Simulation testing  
o Coverage test 
o Black box tests  
o White box  tests  
o Stress tests 
 Qanalysis_vv_vv_process/A7  
  Test procedure /A7-1 o Is the test performed correctly? 
o Does the test reflect the actual usage of the final system? 
o Is the ‘oracle’ correct? 
o Are all test results correct, or if not, are the discrepancies 
explained? 
  Test results/A7-2 Are all test results correct, or if not, are the discrepancies explained? 
  Test completeness o Have all specified functions been tested? 
o Have all specified safety actions been tested? 
o Has fault injection been used to test the robustness of the system 
sw verification cases and procedures? 
  Test coverage/ A7-3 – 8 Does the test cover 
o High-level requirements  
o Low-level requirements 
o All software structures 
o All decisions 
o All branches 
 Qproduct_sw_CMP/ A8  
  problem_reports/ A8 11-17 Are all problems revealed during the software development reported, 
including  
o Non-compliance with software plans and standards? 
o Deficiencies of output of software life cycle processes? 
o Anomalous behaviour of software products? 
o Are the corrections of all these problems reported? 
 Qproduct_SQAP/ A9  
  sqa_in_practice Is the software quality assurance process properly performed and 
recorded?  
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 Qproduct_cl_process/ A10  
  certification_feedback Has the development been made in co-ordination with, and with 
feedback from, the certification authorities? 
 Qproduct_sw_metrics If any type of software measurement has been performed, what is the 
result?  
 mmi_aspects Have Human-System Interaction aspects been properly considered 
during the development of the system? 
 analysis_team How good is the analysis team performance? 
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Abstract.  
This paper discusses some software safety standards, with respect to how they can be used to 
measure software safety. The possibility to transfer the requirements of a software safety 
standard into Bayesian Belief Nets is also investigated. The aim is to utilise the BBN 
methodology and associated tools, to transfer the software safety measurement into a 
probabilistic quantity. In this way software can be included in probabilistic safety analysis of 
the total programmable system. A project was performed in which the method was applied 
for evaluation of a real, safety related programmable system that was developed according to 
the avionic standard DO-178B. The test case, the standard, and the BBN methodology are 
shortly described, followed by a description of the construction of the BBN used in this 
project. Also a summary of some of the findings and experiences from the study is provided. 
1.  Introduction 
During the last decades the digital revolution has made society increasingly dependent 
on programmable digital equipment. Such equipment has to an increasing degree become of 
importance for our safety, and one must therefore trust that it performs its tasks in a correct 
and reliable way. Traditionally, there are various kinds of equipment one places confidence 
in, from car breaks and train stop signals to emergency shut down systems in nuclear power 
plants. The introduction of digital technology in safety critical systems has many advantages, 
both concerning flexibility and reliability. In later years it is also becoming a necessity, as 
conventional equipment is often no longer produced. There is, however, one aspect that has 
caused a certain reluctance to use programmable equipment in safety critical systems, viz. 
the complexity of safety assessment of the software in these systems. 
The research programme at the Halden Project on software safety assessment was 
argued through a joint project with Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace AS (KDA) and Det 
Norske Veritas (DNV) (Gran et. al. 2000). The objective of this project was to investigate 
the possibility of combining the Bayesian Belief Net (BBN) methodology with a software 
safety standard, DO-178B (RTCA/DO-178B) for safety analysis of a programmable system. 
Please note that this paper represents by no means any official policy of KDA. 
2.  Standards and Guidelines for Safety Related Software 
Recently much effort has been taken to make international standards and guidelines 
for the development of programmable systems for safety related applications. A generic 
standard is IEC 61508 'Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic 
safety-related systems' (IEC 61508). This standard will constitute a framework for other, 
more specific standards. Examples of branch specific standards are IEC-880 (IEC880), 
IAEA software safety guide (IAEA ID NS 264) in the nuclear industry, and DO-178B for 
safety critical software in civil aviation. A general impression from these standards is that 
they are built on the same basic framework, and follow the same principles, although they 
may differ in the aspects they put special emphasis on. The common framework is expressed 
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in a software lifecycle model, where the different stages in the system development are 
placed. For each of these stages requirements or recommendations are given. The division 
into stages, and the starting and end stages of the lifecycle model, may differ between the 
standards. The standards also differ in the requirements they are particularly emphasising. 
Even if different standards vary in the degree of detail, a general characteristic of software 
standards is that the requirements and recommendations are of qualitative nature, in 
distinction from hardware standards where there in general are clear and objective 
requirements. Ideally a requirement in a standard should be objective in two ways: the 
requirement itself should be objective in an unambiguous way, and there should be an 
objective way to state whether the requirement is fulfilled or not. This problem is thoroughly 
discussed in (Neil and Fenton 1998). 
A question in connection with software safety standards is whether the fulfilment of 
their requirements actually guarantees that the system is safe. A standard is in general 
developed, over a long time period, by a group of experts. Other experts around the world 
then review the draft international standards. Such a thorough preparation by internationally 
renowned experts should strongly indicate that a system made according to this standard is 
safe. There is, however, no objective evidence that guarantees that this is true. Even the 
views of experts are to a large degree based on judgement. In addition, the experts in this 
field constitute a fairly limited society, so it is likely that they are strongly influenced by 
each other. Of course, the safety assessment is not necessarily based on qualitative 
judgement only. There are analytical methods like e.g. fault tree analysis, reverse 
engineering, formal verification, etc., as well as statistical reliability evaluation based on 
operating experience or testing. Testing is essential for a safety assessment of the final 
product. A general impression is, however, that the standards are not very precise on 
required strategies for testing, but leave this to human judgement. 
A conclusion from these considerations is that it is not straightforward to decide 
objectively whether a software-based system is sufficiently safe on the basis of the criteria 
given in a standard only. There is a need for a systematic decision support system associated 
with a standard, which can help the licensing authority or any safety assessor. It is suggested 
that Bayesian Belief Nets and associated tools can provide this help. 
3.  Bayesian Belief Nets 
Applying Bayesian Belief Nets (BBN) is a method to make reliability estimates based 
on information of disparate nature, by combining quantitative observations and human 
judgments. The objective of using BBNs in software safety assessment is to show the link 
between observable properties and the confidence one can have in a system. The theory of 
BBNs is well established, and the method has been applied with success in various areas, 
including medical diagnosis and geological exploration. Recently, work has been performed 
in the European projects SERENE (1999) and IMPRESS (2000) and research has resulted in 
various papers, e.g. by Bertolino and Strigini (1996a, b, 1998), Neil et. al. (1996a, b, 1998, 
2000, 2001), Fenton and Neil (1999), Littlewood and Wright (1995, 1997) and Dahll and 
Gran 2000). There are tools to perform computations with BBNs. Here it is particularly 
referred to the HUGIN tool (HUGIN; Alderyd et al. 1993; Jensen 1996) and the SERENE 
methodology (SERENE). 
A Bayesian Belief Net (BBN) is a connected and directed graph, consisting of a set of 
nodes and a set of directed arcs between them. Uncertain variables, both events as well as 
singular propositions, are associated to each node where the uncertainty is expressed by a 
probability density. The probability density expresses our belief or confidence in the various 
possible outcomes of the variable. This probability depends conditionally on the status of 
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other nodes at the incoming edges to the node (the parent nodes). Some nodes are denoted as 
'observable'. They represent the different observable properties of the software system and its 
development. Network edges model relations between adjacent nodes, and the strength of 
these relations is represented as conditional probability distributions. The computation of the 
belief about a specific node (target node) is based on the rules for conditional probability 
calculations backward and forward along the edges, from the observable nodes, through the 
intermediate nodes to the target node (Casella and Berger 1990; Cowell et. al. 1999, Welsh 
1996). 
The construction of the BBN is normally made gradually. Information about the 
software system and the standard (such as DO-178B) is collected and expressed via the 
nodes. The nodes are connected together to a directed graph that expresses the conditional 
relationship between the variables. The aim is to combine information in the net. One way is 
to start from a target node and draw edges to influencing nodes. To decide the direction of an 
edge, one follows the causal direction. However, this direction is not always obvious, in 
particular between nodes representing qualitative variables. In these cases the direction of the 
arrow often goes from higher to lower abstraction level, or from the general to the detailed 
concept. For computations of a realistic BBN computer tools are necessary.  
4. The test case M-ADS and the standard DO-178B  
4.1 The M-ADS Airborne Equipment 
The M-ADS airborne equipment was designed by KDA for installation in helicopter 
aircrafts. The system provides air traffic services transmitting aircraft parameters upon 
request from the air traffic control where personnel will request positioning data. The M-
ADS system is designed to automatically transmit flight information via data link to one or 
more requesting air control centres. M-ADS uses existing avionics on board the aircraft to 
provide aircraft position, speed and additional optional data. The most important data are the 
aircraft position, position accuracy, altitude and time stamp for the data validity. The main 
purpose of the M-ADS Airborne Equipment is to aid in a rescue operation if the helicopter 
has made an emergency landing on the sea. A correct localization is necessary for a 
successful rescue operation, the system is therefore safety critical, and the system had to be 
approved by the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority. The software development process 
was performed according to the DO-178B standard. 
4.2 The DO-178B Standard 
The DO-178B standard is a mandatory guideline for the production of safety critical 
software for airborne systems. This guideline was chosen for the study since the M-ADS 
system is applied in civil aviation, and was previously qualified on the basis of this standard. 
DO-178B discusses aspects of airworthiness certification that pertain to the production of 
software for airborne systems and equipment used in aircrafts. To aid in understanding the 
certification process the system life cycle is briefly discussed to show relationship to the 
software life cycle process. It does not provide guidelines concerning the structure of the 
applicant’s organization, relations to suppliers and personnel qualification criteria. 
DO-178B defines, similar to IEC 61508, a set of five software levels (A, B, to E), 
based on the contribution from software to potential failure conditions as determined by the 
system safety assessment process. The main recommendations in DO-178B are given in a set 
of 10 tables. Each table relates to a certain stage in the development and validation process, 
and contains a set of objectives. The 10 stages in the development and validation process are: 
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•= A1 Software planning process. 
•= A2 Software development process. 
•= A3 Verification of outputs of software requirements process. 
•= A4 Verification of outputs of software design process. 
•= A5 Verification of outputs of software coding & integration process. 
•= A6 Testing of outputs of integration process. 
•= A7 Verification of verification process results. 
•= A8 Software configuration management process. 
•= A9 Software quality assurance process. 
•= A10 Certification liaison process. 
A difference between the two standards is that most of the requirements are mandatory 
in IEC61508, while the requirements are guidelines in DO-178B (Neil and Fenton 1998). 
5. Construction of the BBN for M-ADS 
5.1 The Construction Process 
The basic philosophy of the proposed process is to relate the safety of the system to 
the fulfilment of the requirements in an internationally accepted safety standard. This 
philosophy can of course be questioned, but such standards are based on consensus among 
experts in the area relevant for an actual safety critical system. Even if conformance to a 
safety standard does not imply safety, it is a strong indication of the effort put into making 
the system safe. This indication can also be used as prior probability in a Bayesian model for 
a further safety assessment based on safety testing. Recall that one want to achieve a way of 
stating how well the development of a safety critical system conforms to the requirements of 
the standard. However, such standards do not contain any measures of conformity, but rather 
a large number of requirements of rather disparate nature, which should be fulfilled. The 
objective of the project was to use BBN methodology to construct such a measure. 
The first action in the construction was to identify the main characteristics that may 
influence the dependability of a system. One can distinguish between characteristics that are 
related to the system itself and characteristic that are related to the interaction between the 
system and its environment (usage of the system, potential hazards etc.). The former includes 
quality characteristics, which were divided into four types: 
•= Quality of the producer. (Qproducer) This includes the reputation and experience of the 
producer, quality assurance policy, quality of staff etc. 
•= Quality of the production process. (Qprocess) A high quality implies that the system is 
developed according to guidelines for good software engineering, that all phases are 
well documented, and that the documentation shows that the system at all development 
phases possesses desirable quality attributes as completeness, consistency, traceability 
etc. 
•= Quality of the product. (Qproduct) This includes quality attributes for the final product, 
as reliability, simplicity, verifiability etc. 
•= Quality of the analysis. (Qanalysis) This includes all activities performed to validate the 
correctness of the system during all stages of the system development. Such activities 
may include model checking of the specifications, inspections and walkthroughs of the 
documentation, static analysis of code and testing of the system. 
The BBN was constructed in two levels. The higher level shows how nodes 
representing the four types of characteristics listed above are combined with other nodes in 
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the net and lead to nodes representing the reliability and safety of the system. At the lower 
level there are four BBNs, where the four characteristics are represented as top nodes.  
5.2 The Higher Level BBN 
The higher-level network consists of two parts: the quality-part (or soft-evidence part) 
and the testing-part, as presented in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. The higher-level network, the nodes enclosed by '...' represent the 'quality-part', and 
the nodes grouped by '---' represent the 'testing part'. 
 
The quality-part consists of the four quality nodes listed in the previous section. In 
addition it includes the nodes problem complexity and solution complexity. The initial nodes 
or top nodes are the quality node Qproducer and the problem complexity, where the latter is 
an attribute of the system to be developed, and can be measured. It is assumed that the 
Qproducer directly influences the Qprocess, and that the solution complexity is influenced 
by the problem complexity and the Qprocess. The same dependencies are assumed for the 
Qproduct. The product quality depends upon how difficult it is to fulfil the requirements (the 
complexity of the problem), and upon the ability of the development process to handle 
complex systems. The Qanalysis is assumed to be influenced by the Qproducer, how well 
prepared the organization is to perform an analysis, and the solution complexity, how 
difficult it is to analyse. All these assumptions are in accordance with BBNs presented in the 
SERENE project and networks presented by the HRP-project (Dahll and Gran 2000). The 
higher-level network leads to an end node N-hypothetical. The intention is to express that the 
information in the quality-part is equivalent to that the system is tested with N randomly 
chosen inputs without failure. The computation of the 'quality-part' of the BBN is based on 
observations in the lower level networks, and conditional probability tables associated with 
the edges in the BBN. 
The testing-part represented by the node 'Y: failures in N new tests', describes the 
N Hypothetical 
Solution Complexity 
Problem complexity Qprocess 
Qproduct 
Qproducer 
Qanalysis 
P 
Y 
N 
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connection between hard evidences, Y=0 failures in N tests, and the failure probability of the 
system (in the context, usage, environment, etc. the system is tested). The failure probability 
can be interpreted either as a number of failures on a defined number of demands, or as a 
number of failures on a defined time period. For the defined number of demands N with the 
constant failure probability P the random number of failures Y has a binomial distribution. 
The failure probability P can be linked to a node representing the system safety, which 
in addition is also depending on the usage of the system and the consequences of eventual 
failures. In the described project no modelling of the dependencies with respect to the system 
safety was made. Of this reason these nodes are not included in Figure 1, and no calculations 
related to this node were done. 
The link between the quality-part and the testing-part is given by the edge between N-
Hypothetical and P. The dependency associated with this edge, leading to the results 
presented, was given by 'P = 1/ N-Hypothetical'. However, it was applied in the way that 
P(P∈[p,q]) = P(N-Hypothetical ∈[1/q,1/p]). The same dependency would have arisen by 
assuming direct dependencies between P and the nodes Qanalysis, Solution Complexity and 
QProduct. For the expert team it was, however, conceptual easier by this two-step procedure. 
5.3 The Lower Level BBN Identification Based on DO-178B 
The lower-level BBNs were constructed by applying the quality characteristics with 
top-nodes in four BBNs. Each top node was linked to intermediate nodes representing the 10 
process stages of DO-178B (A1 – A10). Each of these nodes was again linked to other 
intermediate nodes representing the objectives of the tables. In addition some additional 
objectives to be considered in the networks were identified.  
The further step was to identify a list of questions to each objective. These questions 
were based on the understanding of the text in the main part of DO-178B, and they were in 
general formulated so that the answer can be given by a yes or a no. However, as the 
questions often are of a qualitative nature, it may be difficult to give a straight answer. It was 
therefore possible to answer the question with a number between 0 and 1 as an expression of 
the strength in the belief that the answer is yes (1) or no (0). This number was then used as 
input to the computation of the BBN. In some cases a question was linked directly to an end-
node, in other cases the questions introduced a list of help questions to be considered, when 
assessing ones belief in answering yes on the end-node. 
An illustrating example is given in Figure 2. Start with the top node Qanalyses and 
continue through the node referring to stage A2 'software development process', to the node 
'does the source code', referring to the objective A2-11.11. To this node there is associated 
four questions: 
•= Does the source code possess correct implementation of all low-level requirements? 
•= Does the source code possess consistency? 
•= Does the source code possess tracability? 
•= Does the source code possess verifiability? 
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Figure 2. A part of the BBN for the Quality of the analysis 
5.4 The prior and conditional probability tables 
The probability distribution functions (pdfs) to the nodes and edges were based on 
discrete probability tables. The advantages of the pdfs in discrete form are that it becomes 
conceptually easier in an expert judgement to assign discrete values, and that it makes the 
computation simple. An expert group assessed the conditional probability tables (cpt) to the 
nodes and edges. This elicitation was done as a brainstorming exercise. In general, this 
means that for each node, the expert group had to assess two conditional probabilities of the 
type P(good measurement | good quality) and P(bad measurement | bad quality). Based on 
general knowledge and experience in software development and evaluation, it was mostly 
done by ranking the importance of the different sub nodes, and giving them probabilities 
from a predefined such as {0.5, 0.7. 0.9, 0.95, 0.99}. The probability tables representing the 
higher-level network, leading to the results in the next section, are presented in the 
Appendix. However note, since the objective of this project was to investigate the possibility 
of combining the BBN methodology with a software safety standard, the tables are not 
validated. For the lower-level network about 130 conditional probability tables were 
assessed.  
 
possess consistency? 
possess verifiability? 
possess tracability? 
possess correct 
implementation of all  
low-level requirements? 
Qanalysis
(...)
A2 - software development process 
A2-11.9: Is tracability 
between ... 
A2-11.11: Does the 
source code: 
A2-11.12: Is the 
exutable object 
translation into 
executable code made 
trustworthy? 
high level req. spec. 
correct unique and 
(...) 
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6.  Computation on the M-ADS BBN 
6.1 Description of Assumptions, Restrictions and Scenarios 
As the project created a rather complex BBN (or system of BBNs), there were a large 
number of conditional probability tables to be assessed. These were estimated based on 
judgments in a brainstorming activity among the project participants. Of course, this opens 
for some subjectivity. On the other hand, some of the project members were considered as 
experts within their field. 
After observing the results of four initial scenarios: no observations, KDA 
observations, best case and worst case, some additional scenarios were defined. For all 
scenarios observations had been made with respect to the four quality characteristics and the 
node P. In this paper some results from these scenarios are presented: 
•= Partial: the effect of observations during only one stage in the development and 
validation process, such as A1, A2... A10. 
•= Incremental: the effect of first observing during the stage A1, then A2, and so on, 
representing the fact that the processes can be viewed as sequential. 
•= Sensitivity analysis for the node P given different values on N. 
6.2 Observations on the End Nodes 
The observations were done by KDA through several interview sessions with experts 
involved in the project. Totally, experts representing the software design and coding role, as 
well as project management role, were involved. In each session the questions associated 
with the end nodes in the network were used to assess the module in view of the scope 
defined by the node. The answers were, as discussed in section 5.3, given as weighted values 
on the scale from zero to one. In general the value zero means objective achieved with poor 
quality, while the value one means objective achieved at highest level of quality. There also 
were a few cases where a score, say 0.95, indicated objective achieved at highest level of 
quality for 95% of the modules. As an example refer to a question for the BBN for 
Qanalysis: 'is the software quality assurance process properly performed and recorded?' The 
answer, 0.95, means that the expert board judged that software quality assurance process is 
properly performed and recorded for 95% of the modules. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1  The Partial Scenarios 
The effect of the observations during only one stage in the development and validation 
process showed that with respect to the Qproducer the processes with largest effect were the 
software planning process (A1), the software development process (A2) and verification of 
process results (A7). Note, however, that the effects were approximately the same for the 
other processes. With respect to the Qprocess the processes with largest effect were 
verification of outputs of software requirements process (A3), software configuration 
management process (A8) and certification liaison process (A10), while 'other aspects' had 
lowest effect.  
With respect to the Qproduct the processes with largest effect were the process A7 
and 'other aspects' including aspects such as e.g. human machine interfaces. Quite low effect 
was observed for the processes: verification of outputs of software design processes (A4) and 
the process A10. In particular it was noted that one observation, with respect to process A4, 
was given the value 0. This value corresponded to a negative answer to the question 'is the 
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software partitioning integrity confirmed?' Whether this answer was meant to be negative; 
i.e. that this question is of importance to the reliability of the product, or if this question was 
ranked as irrelevant, was not further discussed. In the latter case it would have been better 
not to give any value to this observable node at all. This is equivalent to cutting the edge to 
this node. A walk-through of the observations (Gran 2001) also identified 6 additional 
questions with questionable observations. Of these 6 questions one belonged to the process 
A10. The result of correcting these faults was that the surprising low effect for A4 and A10 
disappeared. Further, the processes with low effect were now observed to be A1 and A8. 
These were both also identified as contributors to low effect for the other quality 
characteristics. On the other hand, if one assumes that the observations in fact were negative 
or as low as entered, then there is identified a case where only a few negative observations 
can lead to negative significant changes in the partial scenarios. 
With respect to the Qanalysis the process 'other aspects' had largest effect, but also all 
the other processes had a large effect. For the node P the largest effects were for the 
processes A3, A7 and "other aspects", while the lowest effects were for the processes A4 and 
A10. These results are in accordance with the dependency between the node P and the nodes 
Qproduct and Qanalysis. 
6.3.2 The Incremental Scenarios 
The observations could also be added subsequently, first during process A1, then A2 
and so on. This illustrates how the posterior probability distributions change from the initial 
prior values towards a scenario given by all the KDA observations. For the Qproducer the 
expected value came up to a top level already after observations during processes A1 and A2 
were made. This does not mean that the quality of the producer will remain on this level 
independent of other additional observations, but means that making additional 'good' 
observations does not change our posterior results. With respect to the nodes Qprocess, 
Qproduct, and Qanalysis we had to make positive observations on all the processes A1 
towards A8 before the posterior probability distributions achieved the top level. For the node 
P, the posterior distribution was at its top level after observations were made during process 
A1 up to A3. This is the similar effect as for the Qproducer. Note that, although there is no 
direct link between these two nodes, they behave in the same manner due to the propagation 
of positive measurements. 
6.3.3 Sensitivity Cases 
A sensitivity analysis was performed for the node P given future observations on the 
node N (new tests). That is, with all the observations on the quality characteristics, 
represented in the node N_hypothetical, different measurements were made on the node N. 
Note that making a measurement equal to m assumes that a failure occurred after m failure 
free tests. The posterior probability distributions for P are shown in Figure 3. Compared to 
testing alone, these results show that observing m failure free tests, where m is higher than 
the hypothetical N failure free tests, will increase our belief in a shift left of the distribution 
for P. In the same way, observing m lower than N will shift it right, due to the situation that 
our prior belief is not in accordance with the real measurements. 
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Figure 3. The posterior probability distribution for P for different number of new tests. 
7. Experiences from the Evaluation 
The BBN methodology was mainly developed and applied in the AI society, but more 
recently there have been attempts to apply it for estimation of the dependability of 
programmable safety related systems. From the experiences from applying the methodology 
on the M-ADS system, including a BBN modelling of the DO-178B guideline, we can 
conclude that the BBN methodology offers a systematic way to combine quantitative and 
qualitative evidences of relevance for the safety assessment of programmable systems. 
Conceptually, estimation of the dependability of programmable systems is nearly 
impossible to compute, since many of the characteristics to be considered are of qualitative 
nature and not directly measurable, but have to be estimated. The most difficult activity was 
to perform the expert judgment, in particular in the assignment of values to the conditional 
probability distributions. Even if some of the project members can be considered as experts 
within their fields, it is highly recommendable to make use of some expert judgment tools or 
expert judgment expertise. 
Another observation is that the establishment of the BBNs and prior probability 
distributions was rather time consuming. However, the process of building up the network, 
e.g. by making questionnaires, and the elicitation of the prior distributions were related to 
DO-178B, and not to the actual system. This implies that the network and questions are of a 
general nature, and can be reused in many applications. They can also be gradually improved 
based on experience. Furthermore, it may be feasible to transfer this knowledge to other 
safety related software engineering standards. It should also be remarked, that the project 
provided an improved understanding of the DO-178B. 
The experiences from collecting the different observable properties to be used in the 
calculations, and performing the calculations, are that these tasks are fairly easy and not so 
time consuming. Since tool support is necessary, we applied the HUGIN tool and the 
SERENE methodology (Demo 1.0), and found them satisfactory. 
Knowledge within BBN and probabilistic theory is of great advantage in the 
construction of the networks and the assessment of the probability distributions. This 
knowledge is also an advantage in the evaluation of the results from the computations. 
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Another finding from the project is that the BBN methodology is not only applicable 
in the final assessment of a system, but could be used at all stages throughout the whole 
software lifecycle. The network could e.g. in this specific project be used to evaluate the 
difference between two different safety levels before any other measurements are collected. 
In this way it is possible to make assessments about the system before it is even designed or 
implemented. In such a way corrections to e.g. the development process can be made early in 
the project, in order to be able to reach specific objectives of the final product. 
 
8. Further Work 
The work presented in this paper is a part of a long-term research activity by the 
OECD Halden Reactor Project (HRP), for example is a further analysis of the results 
presented in (Gran 2001), and an approach to merge the networks presented here with a 
network representing evidence from disparate operational environments is evaluated through 
a joint-project between HRP and VTT Automation, Finland (Gran and Helminen 2001). 
It has also been identified that the sub networks based upon DO-178B should be 
revised and more clearly defined. That is, it should be checked that each selected node 
belongs to the network, and one should also check for missing nodes. Further, the meaning 
of each node state should be more clearly defined. The application of expert judgment tools 
in order to obtain better expert judgments on the prior probability distributions is a related 
possibility that should be exploited. The possibility of validating the BBNs or a sub network 
including the topology (which node is connected to which node), and the probability 
distributions (the probability of observing a certain state given that the parent node is in a 
certain state) should also be investigated. 
Acknowledgement 
I want to acknowledge the rest of the team taking part in the modelling and evaluation 
of the M-ADS case: Siegfried Eisinger, Det Norske Veritas; Eivind J. Lund, Jan Gerhard 
Norstrøm, Peter Strocka and Britt J. Ystanes, all Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace; and 
Gustav Dahll, OECD Halden Reactor Project. I also want to acknowledge Martin Neil for 
advice and interest with respect to the use of SERENE (Demo 1.0), and Hugin Expert A/S 
for allowing me the use of the HUGIN tool for my Ph.D. work, and for supporting help. 
References 
Aldenryd, S.H., Jensen, K.B., and Nielsen, L.B., 1993, Hugin Runtime for MS-Window, Tool 
made by Hugin Expert a/s, Aalborg, <http://www.hugin.dk> 
Bertolino, A., and Strigini, L., 1996a, Predicting Software Reliability from Testing Taking 
into Account Other Knowledge about a Program. Proceedings 9th International 
Software Quality Week (Software Research Institute, San Francisco). 
Bertolino, A., and Strigini L., 1996b, Acceptance Criteria for Critical Software Based on 
Testability Estimates and Test Results. Proceedings SAFECOMP96, 15th International 
Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security, Schoitsch (ed) (Springer-
Verlag), pp 83-94. 
Bertolino, A., and Strigini, L., 1998, Assessing the risk due to software design faults: 
estimates of failure rate vs. evidence of perfection, Software Testing, Verification and 
Reliability, 8(3), 155-166. 
Casella, G., Berger, R. L., 1990. Statistical Inference, Wadsworth & Brooks/Cole Advanced 
Books & Software. 
 12 
Cowell, R.G., Dawid, A.P., Lauritzen, S.L., and Spiegelhalter, D.J., 1999, Probabilistic 
Networks and Expert Systems (Springer-Verlag). 
Dahll, G., and Gran, B.A., 2000, The Use of Bayesian Belief Nets in Safety Assessment of 
Software Based Systems. Special Issues of International Journal on Intelligent 
Information Systems at FLINS'98, Int. J. General Systems, 24(2), 205-229. 
Fenton, N., and Neil, M., 1999, A Critique of Software Defect Prediction Models, IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering, 25(5), 675-689. 
Gran, B.A. 2001. Applying Bayesian Belief Net in Software Safety Assessment on a Real, 
Safety Related Programmable System. Paper accepted for ESREL 2001, 16.-20. 
September 2001, Torino, Italy. 
Gran, B.A., Dahll, G., Eisinger, S., Lund, E., Norstrøm, J., Strocka, P., and Ystanes, B., 
2000, Estimating Dependability of Programmable Systems Using BBNs. Computer 
Safety, Reliability and Security, Proceedings from Safecomp 2000, (Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science 1943), Koornneef and van der Meulen (Eds) (Springer), pp. 309-320. 
Gran, B.A., and Helminen, A., 2001, A Bayesian Belief Network for Reliability Assessment, 
Computer Safety, Reliability and Security (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2187), 
Voges (Ed) (Springer), pp. 35-45. 
IAEA, ID NS 264, 1999. Software for Computer systems Important to Safety in NPPs: A 
Draft Safety Guide. 
IEC publication 61508, 2000, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable 
electronic safety-related systems. 
IEC 880, 1986, Software for computers in the application of industrial safety related 
systems. 
IMPRESS, 1999, Improving the software process using Bayesian nets. EPSRC project nr. 
GR/L06683, <http://www.csr.city.ac.uk/csr_city/projects/impress.html>. 
Jensen, F., 1996, An Introduction to Bayesian Networks, (UCL Press, University College 
London). 
Neil, M., Littlewood, B., and Fenton, N., 1996a, Applying Bayesian Belief Nets to Systems 
Dependability Assessment, Proceedings of 4th Safety Critical Systems Symposium, 
(Springer-Verlag), pp. 71-93. 
Neil, M., and Fenton, N., 1996b, Predicting Software Quality using Bayesian Belief 
Networks, Proceedings of 21st. Annual Software Engineering Workshop, (NASA 
Goddard Space Flight Centre), pp. 217-230. 
Neil, M., and Fenton, N., 1998, A strategy for improving safety related software engineering 
standards, IEEE Trans. on SW Eng., 24(11). 
Neil, M., Fenton, N., and Nielsen, L., 2000, Building large-scale Bayesian Networks, The 
Knowledge Engineering Review, 15(3), 257-284. 
Neil, M., Fenton, N., Forey, S., and Harris, R., 2001, Using Bayesian Belief Networks to 
Predict the Reliability of Military Vehicles, IEEE Computing and Control Engineering, 
12(1), 11-20. 
RTCA/DO-178B, 1999, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certifications (Guideline). 
SERENE, 1999, Safety and Risk Evaluation using Bayesian Nets. ESPRIT Framework IV 
nr. 22187, <http://www.hugin.dk/serene/>. 
Welsh, A. H., 1996, Aspects of Statistical Inference, (Wiley & Sons). 
 
 13 
Appendix: The probability tables for the higher-level network (7 tables) 
 
5 good .06 
4 .44 
3 .45 
2 .05 
Quality of producer 
1 bad .01 
 
low .167 
medium .500 Problem complexity 
high .333 
 
Quality of producer 5 good 4 3 2 1 bad 
good .90 .80 .50 .10 .05 
Quality of process 
bad .10 .20 .50 .90 .95 
 
Problem complexity low medium high 
Quality of process good bad good bad good bad 
good .90 .30 .60 .40 .30 .10 
Quality of product 
bad .10 .70 .40 .60 .70 .90 
 
Problem complexity low medium high 
Quality of process good bad good bad good bad 
low .90 .70 .10 .10 .01 .00 
medium .10 .20 .80 .60 .19 .05 
Solution 
complexity 
high .00 .10 .10 .30 .80 .95 
 
Solution complexity low medium high 
Quality of producer 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 
good .99 .95 .90 .70 .30 .95 .90 .70 .30 .10 .80 .70 .50 .30 .10
Quality of analyses 
bad .01 .05 .10 .30 .70 .05 .10 .30 .70 .90 .20 .30 .50 .70 .90
 
Quality of product good bad 
Solution complexity low medium high low medium high 
Quality of analyses g b g b g b g b g b g b 
<1000000, Inf> .01 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
<100000, 1000000] .70 .50 .01 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
<10000, 100000] .25 .40 .70 .50 .01 .01 .01 .01 0 0 0 0 
<1000, 10000] .04 .09 .25 .40 .70 .50 .70 .50 .01 .01 0 0 
<100, 1000] 0 0 .04 .09 .25 .40 .25 .40 .70 .50 .10 0 
<10, 100] 0 0 0 0 .04 .09 .04 .09 .25 .40 .80 .10
N 
hypothetical 
[0, 10] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .04 .09 .10 .90
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ABSTRACT: The paper discusses how disparate sources of information can be combined in 
the safety assessment of software-based systems. The emphasis is put on an emerging 
methodology, relevant for intelligent product support systems, to combine information about 
disparate evidences in a systematic way based on Bayesian Belief Networks. The objective is 
to show the link between basic information and the confidence one can have in a system. It is 
also illustrated and discussed how to combine the Bayesian Belief Net (BBN) method with a 
software safety standard (RTCA/DO-178B) for safety assessment of software-based systems. 
Finally the applicability of the BBN methodology, and experiences from co-operative 
research work together with Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace and Det Norske Veritas, and 
ongoing research with VTT Automation are presented. 
1 Introduction 
With the use of programmable equipment in safety critical systems a new aspect was 
introduced, to produce safe software. Therefore there is in many application areas necessary 
with a thorough safety assessment of the system, including intelligent product support 
systems, for a final acceptance or licensing of the system. For a hardware component, even 
in a safety critical system, it is accepted to assume that a failure can occur during the lifetime 
of the system, given that the expected frequency and/or consequence of the failure is 
sufficiently low. The reliability of a hardware system is thereby based on failure statistics, 
i.e. one measures the failure frequency in standard components and computes the system 
reliability on the basis of this, although that this practise may ignore the inherent faults in the 
hardware. The characteristics of software make it difficult to carry out such a reliability 
assessment. Software is not subject to ageing, and any failure that occurs during operation is 
due to faults that are inherent in the software from the beginning. Furthermore, any 
randomness in software failure is due to randomness in the input data, because software 
behaviour change over time due to maintenance activities, or due to the fact that 
environments, such as hardware, operating system and user needs, change over time. As a 
consequence, there is a problem with the assessment and licensing of systems, both hardware 
and software, with inherent faults.  
As discussed by Dahll and Gran (Dahll and Gran 2000) one can distinguish between 
three principles for licensing: rule based, risk based, and judgement based. Rule based 
licensing implies that an assessor checks that a system fulfils a set of criteria given in a 
safety standard. The rules are easy to follow for the developer and easy to check for the 
assessor. On the other side, this method easily gets very rigid and inadequate to handle new 
technology. The rules for safe software are normally based on consensus among experts of 
what is required for safety critical software. This is expressed through standards and 
 2 
guidelines. In a risk based assessment the objective is rather to base the licensing on 
assessing the probability of potential risks associated with the system. This means to identify 
potential hazards, and demonstrate that the probabilities of these hazards are kept under a 
certain safety integrity level. In practice, however, the assessment of safety critical software 
are often faced with the problem of approving systems for which there are no clear rules, and 
for which it is difficult to apply probabilistic methods. The rules given in standards and 
guidelines are often imprecise, or they are not directly applicable for an actual system. One 
possibility for assessors and licensing authorities is to make their judgement based on the 
opinion of experts in various fields, including process knowledge, reliability engineering, 
human factors etc. The combined judgement of the different evidences about the system and 
its environment constitutes the basis for approval or not. 
Another approach to assess software with inherent faults is to apply various 
reliability growth models (Xie, 1991). They are, however, mainly applicable to large 
commercial systems, and not to safety critical software. The main reason is that a computer 
program implemented in a safety critical system presumably contains no known faults, since 
any revealed fault would be corrected. There is a possibility that it contains unknown faults. 
An alternative reliability measure is then the confidence in fault freeness of the program, or 
more generally the upper limit of the 'bug-size' (Voas et al. 1993, Gran and Thunem 1998). 
A way to measure this confidence is based on statistical testing. The validity of this 
measurement is, nevertheless, highly dependent on a proper choice of test data (Leveson 
1995). Another problem with these measures is that they do not take into account that there 
are several factors that are important to software reliability (Dahll 1997), even if they cannot 
be put directly into a reliability formula. Some of these are of qualitative nature, like the 
producers reputation, the development quality etc. Others are measurable, but not directly 
connected to reliability estimation, like program size, program complexity etc. The 
connection between these quantities and software reliability is also of qualitative nature. It is 
also suggested to apply traditional methods in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) to 
software (Leveson 1995, Dahll, 1997, Cudleigh and Catmur 1992). As reasons for this 
choice it is argued that these methods are well tried, standardised, documented and familiar 
to the customers (Stålhane 1997). Furthermore, it allows the customer to contribute with 
their knowledge about the system. An approach of combining traditional methods for risk 
analysis with semi-formal modelling is argued through the description of the EU-project 
CORAS (IST-2000-25031). 
The focus of this paper is on the use of Bayesian Belief Nets (BBN) to combine 
evidences from several information sources in the safety assessment of software based 
systems. This methodology has mainly been developed and applied in the AI society. More 
recently, it has also been applied to software safety assessment. Work in this area has been 
performed in the European projects SERENE (1999), IMPRESS (2000) and DeVa, in 
particular through previous research at the Centre for Software Reliability at City University, 
and present research at Queen Mary, University in London. The research has resulted in 
various papers, e.g. by Bertolino and Strigini (1996a, b, 1998), Neil et. al. (1996a, b, 1998, 
2000, 2001), Fenton and Neil (1999) and Littlewood and Wright (1995, 1997).  
This has also been the topic for research at the OECD Halden Reactor Project (HRP)  
(Dahll and Gran 2000). An attempt to combine the BBN technology with the rules of a 
standard for safety critical software, RTCA/DO-178B (1999) was done in an experimental 
project, (Gran et al. 2000), carried out by a consortium composed of HRP, and the 
Norwegian companies Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace AS (KDA) and Det Norske Veritas 
(DNV). Another sub-project of this long-term research is a co-operative project between 
HRP and VTT-Automation in Finland. One objective of this work is to investigate how the 
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network, representing the software safety guideline RTCA/DO-178B and different quality 
aspects, (Gran et al. 2000), can be merged with a network, developed by VTT (Helminen 
2000), representing evidence from disparate operational environments. This paper describes 
experiences from both projects. 
 
Figure 1. Influence graph of a safety acceptance and acceptance process of software  
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2 The BBN methodology 
2.1 Background 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) methodology was introduced in the 1980s, and is 
in particular described in the book by Pearl (1988) and the paper by Lauritzen and 
Spiegelhalter (1988). In 1993 the tool HUGIN (Aldenryd, Jensen and Nielsen 1993, Jensen 
1996) was introduced, which made BBN's feasible. The theory, however, is based on the 
Bayes Rule, discovered by Sir Thomas Bayes (1744-1809) which says for two variables X 
and Y that P(X|Y)= P(Y|X)*P(X)/P(Y). By allowing {Xi} be a complete set of mutually 
exclusive instances of X, this formula can be extended. A description of Bayesian 
interference, Bayesian Network methodology and theory for calculations on BBNs can also 
be found in the books by Gelman et al. (1995), Welch (1996), Cowell et al. (1999), the report 
by Pulkkinen and Holmberg (1997), and older references such as Whittaker (1990), and 
Speigelhalter et al. (1993). 
A Bayesian Belief Net (BBN) is a connected and directed graph, consisting of a set 
of nodes and a set of directed arcs (or links) between them. Uncertain variables, both events 
and singular propositions, are associated to each node where the uncertainty is expressed by 
a probability density. The probability density expresses our confidence to the various 
variable outcomes, and depends conditionally on the status of the 'parent' nodes at the 
incoming edges. The nodes and associated variables can be classified into three groups: 
•= Target node(s) - the node(s) about which the objective of the network is to make an 
assessment. A typical example of such nodes is 'No faults in a program'. 
•= Intermediate nodes - nodes for which one have limited information, or only 'beliefs'. The 
associated variables are the hidden variables. Typical hidden variables represent quality 
aspects such as 'development quality', 'producers reputation', or 'quality at a certain stage 
of the development' without discussing 'quality' in detail. 
•= Observable nodes - nodes which can be directly observed. Some examples are nodes 
representing observable properties about the system for evaluation: 'no failures during 
testing' and 'all quality requirements are fulfilled'.  
Application of the BBN method consists of three tasks:  
•= construction of BBN topology,  
•= elicitation of probabilities to nodes and edges, and  
•= making computations. 
2.2 The construction of BBN topology 
The literature on BNN has mostly presented small 'complete' BBN's (Neil et al. 
2000). The construction of small BBN can be made gradually. Information about the system 
is collected and expressed via the nodes. The nodes are connected to a directed graph that 
expresses the conditional relationship between the variables. The aim is to combine 
information in the net. One way is to start from a target node and draw edges to influencing 
nodes. To decide the direction of an edge, one follows the causal direction. However, this 
direction is not always obvious, in particular between nodes representing qualitative 
variables. In these cases the direction of the arrow often goes from higher abstraction to 
lower abstraction, or from the more general concept to the more detailed. A general 
interpretation of an arrow between two nodes A and B is that a 'belief' in A implies 
expectations on B. The practical procedure is to start with constructing a BBN, containing 
nodes representing high-level information. In figure 1 the influence graph of a 'safety 
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acceptance and acceptance process of the software' (Dahll 2001) is presented. It is not itself a 
BBN, but quite similar, so it is fairly straightforward to construct a high level BBN for safety 
assessment based on this (Dahll and Gran 2000), see the BBN shown in figure 2.  
When building larger-scale BBN's this procedure is rather effort consuming. Neil, Fenton 
and Nielsen (2000) offers a solution based on building blocks (idioms), which serve solution 
patterns. These can then be combined into larger BBN's. This approach is for example 
applied in the SERENE project (1999), and has been applied to construct large-scale BBN's 
for predicting software safety. The use of idioms is also applied for the construction of the 
BBN's presented in the next chapter. However, the BBN's are not of such large-scale, so it is 
also possible to argue through the 'causal direction approach'. 
 
 
Figure 2. BBN for System Quality  
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probability tables between the states of the variables associated with the start node and the 
end node of the edge respectively. However, since many of the aspects to be considered are 
of qualitative nature and not directly measurable estimation may be difficult. This was 
observed for the co-operative project between HRP, KDA and DNV (Gran et. al. 2000), even 
if some of the project members can be considered as experts in their fields. It is therefore 
highly recommendable to make use of some expert judgment tools or expert judgment 
expertise. Another observation was that the establishment of the BBNs and prior conditional 
pdfs was rather time consuming.  
The problem of defining the node probability tables is also addressed by Neil, 
Fenton and Nielsen (2000). They applied a 'divide and conquer' approach to build the BBN's. 
This manages the complexity of the BBN's, and thereby reduces the number of probability 
values to be addressed.    
2.4 Making computations 
Making computations with BBNs above a certain size and complexity is rather 
difficult by hand, but is rather easy by applying the latest computerised tools. At HRP the 
HUGIN tool (Aldenryd, Jensen and Nielsen 1993) has been used, and in the co-operative 
project with KDA and DNV both HUGIN and the SERENE methodology (1999) was 
applied.  
The computation of our belief about a specific node (target node) is based on the 
rules for conditional probability calculations given by the Bayesian methodology. The 
procedure is to insert observations in the observable nodes, and then use the rules for 
probability calculation backward and forward along the edges, from the observable nodes, 
through the intermediate nodes to the target node, which again can be an intermediate node 
in a BBN at a higher level. Forward calculation is straight forward, while backward 
computation is more complicated (Spiegelhalter et. al. 1993). For details on computations 
see the references in the beginning of this chapter, and for good examples on making 
computations with BBN's see for example Pearl (1988) and Jensen (1996). 
3 BBN's based upon RTCA/DO-178B, the M-ADS project 
3.1 Background 
The attempt to combine the Bayesian Belief Nets technology with the rules of a 
standard for safety critical software, RTCA/DO-178B (1999), hereafter referred to as DO-
178B, was done in an experimental project carried out by a consortium composed of KDA, 
DNV, and the HRP. First of all the project goal was to evaluate the use of BBN for 
investigating the implementation of the DO-178B standard for software approval in the 
commercials world. To reach that objectives a computerized system for automated 
transmission of graphical position information from helicopters to land based control stations 
was selected and studied (Gran et. al. 2000). Please note that references to the system 
developed by KDA and conclusions here represent by no mean any official policy of KDA.  
The project emphasized the practical evaluation of the BBN methodology by trying 
it out on a realistic test case: a computerized system for automated transmission of graphical 
position information from helicopters to land based control stations (M-ADS). The M-ADS 
airborne equipment was designed by KDA for installation in helicopter aircrafts. The system 
provides air traffic services with aircraft parameters upon request from the air traffic control 
where personnel will request positioning data. The work described below uses parts of the 
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M-ADS system to exemplify the software development process according to DO-178B 
standard. 
3.2 RTCA/DO-178B 
The purpose of the DO-178B standard (1999) is to provide guidelines for the 
production of safety critical software for airborne systems. This guideline was chosen for the 
study since the M-ADS system is applied in civil aviation, and was previously qualified on 
the basis of this standard. DO-178B discusses aspects of airworthiness certification 
pertaining to the production of software for airborne systems and equipment used in aircraft. 
To aid in understanding the certification process the system life cycle is briefly discussed to 
show relationship to the software life cycle process. It does not provide guidelines 
concerning the structure of the applicants organization, relations to suppliers and personnel 
qualification criteria. 
DO-178B defines a set of five software levels (A to E), based on the contribution 
from software to potential failure conditions as determined by the system safety assessment 
process. The main recommendations in DO-178B are given in a set of 10 tables, see descrip-
tion in table 1. Each table relates to a certain stage in the development and validation proc-
ess, and contains a set of objectives. A difference between the DO-178B and e.g. IEC61508 
(2000) is that most of the requirements are mandatory in the latter, while the requirements 
are guidelines in DO-178B (Neil and Fenton 1998). 
 
Table 1: The stages in the development and validation process given by DO-178B 
 Stage in the development and validation process 
A1 Software planning process. 
A2 Software development process. 
A3 Verification of outputs of software requirements process. 
A4 Verification of outputs of software design process. 
A5 Verification of outputs of software coding & integration process. 
A6 Testing of outputs of integration process. 
A7 Verification of verification process results. 
A8 Software configuration management process. 
A9 Software quality assurance process. 
A10 Certification liaison process. 
3.3 The Construction of BBN on the higher level 
The BBN for DO-178B was constructed at two levels. The higher level shows how 
nodes representing four quality aspects are combined with other nodes in the net, and leads 
to a node 'P(failed state)', representing the 'probability of finding the system in a failed state', 
see figure 3. The lower level shows how nodes representing the four quality aspects are 
related to objectives of D0-178B.  The four quality aspects were: 
•= Quality of the producer. (Qproducer) This includes the reputation and experience of the 
producer, quality assurance policy, quality of staff etc. 
•= Quality of the production process. (Qprocess) A high quality implies that the system is 
developed according to guidelines for good software engineering, that all phases are well 
documented, and that the documentation shows that the system at all development phases 
possesses desirable quality attributes as completeness, consistency, traceability etc. 
•= Quality of the product. (Qproduct) This includes quality attributes for the final product, as 
reliability, simplicity, verifiability etc. 
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•= Quality of the analysis. (Qanalysis) This includes all activities performed to validate the 
correctness of the system during all stages of the system development. Such activities 
may include model checking of the specifications, inspections and walkthroughs of the 
documentation, static analysis of code and testing of the system. 
 
In addition to the quality nodes it includes the nodes 'problem complexity' and 
'solution complexity'. The initial nodes or top nodes are the nodes: 'Qproducer' and 'problem 
complexity', where the latter is an attribute of the system to be developed, and can be 
assessed. It was assumed that the 'Qproducer' directly influences the 'Qprocess', ant that the 
'solution complexity' was influenced by the initial 'problem complexity' and the 'Qprocess'. 
The same dependencies were assumed for the 'Qproduct'. Remark however, that this does not 
mean that the product quality depends only upon how difficult it is to fulfil the requirements 
(the complexity of the problem), and upon how good the development process handle 
complex systems. An assessment of the product will also be based upon assessments of the 
lower nets. The 'Qanalysis' was assumed to be influenced by the 'Qproducer', how well 
prepared the organization is to perform an analysis, and the 'solution complexity', how 
difficult it is to analyse. All these assumptions were in accordance with BBNs presented in 
the SERENE project (1999) and networks presented by HRP-project (Dahll and Gran 2000). 
Finally it was assumed that a node representing the 'P(failed state)'is dependent on 
the factors 'Qanalysis', the 'Qproduct' and the 'solution complexity'. This node is not to be 
viewed as a failure rate representing a specific usage or safety function, but rather as a 
deterministic property of the system expressing fault content. One interpretation is the size of 
the inherent faults in the software. Assuming that no failures are found or modifications are 
made during later testing of the system, this true failure rate is not changed; only the 
confidence in the reliability, or freeness of faults, of the program is enhanced. Thereby it also 
offers a support in the assessment of the software.  
 
 
Figure 3. The upper network for DO-178B 
3.4 The Construction of BBN on the lower level 
We constructed a lower level BBN for each of the four quality aspects. This was 
done by first putting the quality aspects as top-nodes in the BBNs. Each top node was then 
linked to intermediate nodes representing the 10 lifecycle stages represented by the tables A1 
to A10 of DO-178B. Each of these nodes were again linked to other intermediate nodes, 
representing the objectives of the tables.  
P(failure state)
Solution Complexity 
Problem complexity Qprocess 
Qproduct 
Qproducer
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The associating of the different objectives to the different quality aspects was done 
by a group of experts, consisting of experts related to the standard itself, development in 
accordance with the standard, and experts within safety assessment of critical systems. Each 
objective was identified to belong to one or more of the quality aspects. In addition a stage 
'hmi-aspects' representing objectives related to human-machine interfaces was added.  
The further step was to identify a list of questions to each objective. These questions 
were based on the understanding of the text in the main part of DO-178B, and then 
formulated so that the answer could be given by a 'yes' or a 'no'. Figure 4 presents an 
example representing the list of questions associated with two of the objectives for the 
software development process (A2) related to the quality of analyses. A list of the questions 
identified related to the 'quality of product' for (A2) is presented in table 2.  
 
Table 2: The questions related to the lifecycle stage A2: software development process 
Objective Question: 
sw req. 
data  
Are all system functional requirements, safety requirements and auxiliary requirements 
specified in the software specification? 
Are all tasks specified in the requirements also included in the design? 
Does the design adequately describe the information flow between components? 
Does the design address sequencing, concurrency and time related information? 
Does the design adequately describe the data structures and their properties? 
Is it a clear separation in the design between safety critical and not safety critical parts of 
the system? 
Are measures for fault tolerance, like diversity or redundancy designed into the system? 
Are control and data flow monitored when safety requirements dictate, e.g. through 
watchdog timers, reasonableness checks, input data checks etc.? 
design 
descrip-
tion 
Are the responses to failure conditions consistent with safety related requirements? 
3.5 The elicitation of probability tables 
The elicitation of conditional probability tables (cpt) to the nodes and edges was 
done as a brainstorming exercise by the expert group. In general, this means that for each 
node, the expert group had to assess two conditional probabilities of the type P(good 
measurement | good quality) and P(bad measurement | bad quality).  
The first probability was relatively easy to assess. Based on general knowledge and 
experience in software development and evaluation, it was mostly done by ranking the 
importance of the different sub nodes, and giving them probabilities from a predefined such 
as {0.5, 0.7. 0.9, 0.95, 0.99}. The latter, however, became very difficult. Often, where the 
experts had stated that there was a dependency between good quality and a specific good 
measurement, they could not state the opposite effect. The approach of ranking the nodes 
had also restricted success. Even if some of the project members can be considered as 
experts within their fields, it is, however, highly recommendable to make use of some expert 
judgement tools or expert judgement expertise.  
The establishment of the BBNs and prior pdfs was rather time consuming, and 
would be even more so for a system. However, the generation of the BBNs was related to 
DO-178B and on safety assessment in general, and not to the actual system. This implies that 
the BBNs have a general nature, and can be reused in many applications. They can also be 
gradually improved based on experience. Remark also that on the lower level, as illustrated 
in figure 4, all nodes had only one parent. This made the complexity of the BBN's 
manageable. In the case of nodes with more incoming edges, it would be a good solution to 
apply the approach suggested by Neil et al. (2000) 
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Figure 4.  Example of a list of questions associated with two of the objectives for the software 
development process related to the quality of analyses 
3.6 Computations 
Finally all the BBNs were implemented, and all the conditional probability tables 
together with observations from the system development (KDA) were fed into the HUGIN 
and SERENE tools. This made it possible to make a variety of computations (Gran et al. 
2000), with the aim to investigate different aspects of the methodology, such as:  
•= What is the effect of observations during only one lifecycle process?  
•= How does the result change by subsequent inclusion of observations from the lifecycle 
processes?  
•= How sensitive is the result to changes in individual observations? 
 
Since the number of possible scenarios is exploding when one wants to explore both 
different sets of observations and prior cpts, a limited number of computations were made. 
However, an interesting observation was that we rapidly found surprising results that re-
quired further discussion and calculations. These results provided a list of topics for further 
research, both with respect to topological issues and with respect to different cases of obser-
vations. The topics are all issues addressed through ongoing research activities. 
One example from this research is the importance of a good quality assurance of the 
observations entered into a BBN. The trigging event was the discovery of a wrong entered 
observation. Correcting this error demonstrated that one negative observations can have a 
Qanalyses 
(...) 
A2 - software development proc-
A2-11.9: Is tracability between ... 
A2-11.11: Does the source code:
A2-11.12: Is the exutable object 
code correct? 
translation into executable code 
made trustworthy? 
high level req. spec. correct 
unique and consistent? 
(...) 
possess verifiability? 
possess tracability? 
possess consistency? 
possess correct implementation of 
all low-level requirements? 
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significant effect on a partial results. The evaluation also showed that one negative 
observation, or a set of a few negative observations is not enough to change the overall 
results.  
3.7 Experiences from the M-ADS project 
One objective of the project was to investigate the possibility to transfer the 
requirements of a software safety standard into a BBN. A review of various software 
standards revealed that they are built on the same basic framework, and follow the same 
principles, although they may differ in the aspect they put special emphasis on. The results 
and experiences with using the avionics standard DO-178B in the test case can therefore be 
seen as representative also for other software safety standards, including those used in the 
nuclear industry.  
The BBN was constructed in two levels. The higher level based on the four qualities: 
Quality of the producer, Quality of the production, Quality of the product, and Quality of the 
analysis is general, and independent of the standard. The lower-level BBN reflects the 
recommendations of DO-178B, in the way that the four qualities were represented as top 
nodes in four sub-BBNs, whereas the objectives given in the tables in appendix A of DO-
178B were represented as observable end nodes in the BBNs. These objectives were 
transformed into questions, and the answers to these were the observations used in the BBN 
computation. The construction of the BBN as it was done in this study is not unique, but 
should be considered as one possible solution in an experimental investigation.  
The prior probability distributions and conditional belief distributions represent 
quantities that reflect a confidence in the standard, and can therefore not be generated on the 
basis of the standard itself. They were therefore determined in the 'expert judgement session'. 
The use of subjective numbers, and the numbers itself can be a separate topic for discussion. 
The objective of determining the numbers in this project was also not to find the best or most 
correct numbers, but to illustrate the approach. The conclusion from the project was that this 
way to construct the networks, combined with questionnaires, seems to be the promising 
mode of proceeding. Furthermore, the BBN methodology offers a systematic way to 
combine quantitative and qualitative evidences of relevance for the safety assessment of 
programmable systems 
Another observation through the project was that the BBN methodology is not only 
applicable in the final assessment of a system, but could be used at all stages throughout the 
software lifecycle. The network could e.g. in this specific project be used to evaluate the 
difference between two different safety levels before any other measurements were 
collected. In this way it is possible to make assessments about the system even before it is 
designed or implemented. In such a way corrections to e.g. the development process can be 
made early in the project, in order to be able to reach specific objectives of the final product. 
4 Extending the BBNs based upon RTCA/DO-178B 
Within the nuclear field there is an increased focus on risk based regulation of 
nuclear power plants. This is in accordance with the new generic guideline for 
programmable safety related systems, IEC-61508 (2000), where probabilistic safety integrity 
levels are given as requirements for safe operation. Therefore, there is a need to establish 
methods to assess the reliability of programmable systems, including the software. One 
approach in this research is an on-going long-term joint research activity between HRP and 
VTT Automation (VTT) in Finland.  
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One objective of this co-operative project is to investigate how a network, 
representing the software safety guideline and different quality aspects, as described in the 
previous chapter, can be merged with a network, developed by VTT, representing evidence 
from disparate operational environments (Helminen 2000).  
4.1 The VTT Approach 
The main sources of reliability evidence in the case of safety critical systems 
considered in the VTT approach are depicted in fig 5, (Neil et. al 1996a). A similar version 
of this model has been presented by Stålhane et al. (1993). Part of the evidence may be 
directly measurable statistical evidence, such as the evidence obtained through operational 
experience and testing. Part of the evidence may be qualitative characterization of the system 
such as the design features and the development process of the system. 
The qualitative characterization of the design features and the development process 
follows certain quality assurance and quality control principles, which are based on 
applicable standards. Running a good development process alone does not guarantee a more 
reliable product. However, the more strict standards the characterizations fulfil, combined 
with good testing results, the more confidence one will become in having a reliable system. 
The evidence based on qualitative characterization can be considered as soft evidence, while 
evidence obtained from operational experience and testing can be considered as hard 
evidence. The exploitation of soft evidence in the reliability analysis of software-based 
system requires extensive use of expert judgment making it quite an unforeseeable matter 
and therefore the VTT approach is mainly focused to the utilization of hard evidence. 
The reliability of a software-based system is modelled as a failure probability 
parameter, which reflects the probability that the automation system does not operate when 
demanded. Information for the estimation of the failure probability parameter can be 
obtained from the disparate sources of hard and soft evidence. To obtain the best possible 
estimate for the failure probability parameter of the target system all evidence should to be 
combined.  
The principle idea of the estimation method is to build a priori estimate for the 
failure probability parameter of software-based system using the soft and hard evidence 
obtained from the system development process, pre-testing and evaluating system design 
features while system is produced, but before it is deployed. The prior estimation is then 
updated to a posterior estimate using the hard evidence obtained from testing after the 
system is deployed and from operational experience while the system is operational. The 
difference between disparate evidence sources can be taken care in the structural modelling 
of the Bayesian Network model.  
 
 
Figure 5. Main sources of reliability evidence in a case of safety critical system 
Operational Experience 
Development Process Design Features 
Testing 
System Reliability
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To analyse the applicability of Bayesian Networks to the reliability estimation of 
software-based systems Bayesian Network models for safety critical systems are built. The 
different models are distinguished by the evidence, which is collected from different systems 
and from different operational profiles. The modelling is done using the WinBUGS program 
(Spiegelhalter et. al. 1996).  
4.2 Evidence from one system with one operational profile 
The Bayesian Network shown in the left part of figure 6 describes a system, for 
which the observed number of failures Y is binomial distributed with parameters N and P 
(Helminen 2000). Parameter N describes the number of demands in the single test cycle and 
parameter P is the random failure probability parameter. This model can be further extended 
to represent a system with several test cycles using the same operational profile (Helminen 
2000).  
To increase the flexibility of the model depicted in the left part, a logit-transformed 
P parameter " is included into the network, and the network becomes as shown to right in 
figure 6. The Bayesian network represented in model 1 can be used in the reliability 
estimation of a software-based system attached with binomial distributed hard evidence 
under unchanged operational profile. 
The hard evidence obtained for the reliability estimation of software-based systems 
is usually obtained from both testing and operational experience. If the testing has been 
carried out under the same operational profile as the operational experience, the Bayesian 
Network becomes same as the network shown in figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Bayesian network for one test cycle (right), and the Model 1 (left) 
4.3 Evidence from one system with more operational profiles 
Often the system is tested with different operational profiles under different 
operational environments. The results from applying the different operational profiles 
provide different failure probabilities for the same system. However, the failure probability 
from testing gives us some information about the failure probability of the system 
functioning in a different operational profile than where the testing was made. This evidence 
provided by testing is valuable and one should make a good use of it by taking into account 
the difference in the operational profiles when building the model. 
Helminen (2000) solve the problem of different operational profiles by first 
connecting the binomial distributed evidence from different operational profiles to separate 
failure probability parameters. Then the logit-transformed failure probability parameters are 
connected to equal each other. The difference in the operational profile of two failure 
probability parameters is introduced in the model by adding a normal distributed random 
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term #*, with parameters µ* and $*, to the logit-transformed failure probability parameter 
obtained from testing. The parameters of the normally distributed random term correspond to 
our belief of the difference between the two operational profiles. The Bayesian Network 
representing the case is illustrated in figure 7 when considering only the upper layer.  
 
 
Figure 7. The model for two operational profiles 
4.4 Merging the HRP approach and the VTT approach 
The merging of the two approaches is based on the on the network presented in figure 3 and 
the network shown in figure 6 (Gran and Helminen 2001). The merged network is displayed 
in figure 8. The merging was done by replacing the node 'P(failure state)' by the node "priori. 
This was done by transformation of the conditional probability tables for P(failure state) into 
continuous normal distributions.  
 
 
Figure 8. The merged network from the VTT and HRP approaches 
 
P 
Y 
N P* 
Y* 
N* 
Θ  
Θ* 
Ω* 
µ* σ* 
Solution Complexity 
Problem complexityQproces
Qproduct 
Qproducer
Qanalyses 
Y: failures in N ... 
" priori
P N
"
 15 
 
Each of the quality aspect nodes was connected to quality aspects, as described in 
section 3.4. That allowed us to directly insert the observations from the M-ADS evaluation 
in the network, and for the merged network we performed calculations for two the case of no 
M-ADS observations and with the M-ADS observations, running from N=100 to 
N=1000000. 
That allowed us to directly insert the observations from the M-ADS evaluation in the 
network, and for the merged network we performed calculations for two different scenarios:  
•= For were we have no M-ADS observations, but zero failures (Y=0), running from 
N=100 to N=1000000. 
•= For were we have the M-ADS observations, and zero failures (Y=0), running from 
N=100 to N=1000000. 
For both scenarios the target was the node for the failure probability. In figure 9 both 
the median and the 97.5% percentile posterior distribution values for P on the logarithmic 
scale are shown. The values for N=1, are the values representing the prior distributions, i.e. 
before starting the testing (and observing Y=0). Remark that the curves for the 97.5% 
percentiles are somewhat "bumpy". This due to the fact, that the values are deduced from 
posterior histograms. 
Figure 9.  Median and 97.5% percentile posterior distribution values for P on the logarithmic 
scale, for the scenario of no observations and the scenario with the observations 
4.5 Experiences from the HRP-VTT project 
The main differences between the two studies lie in the difference of focus areas. The work 
by VTT mainly focuses to studying explicitly the influence of prior distributions to the 
reliability estimation and to the investigation of combining statistical evidence from 
disparate operational environments. The work by the HRP has mainly focused on how to 
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model a software safety guideline, DO-178B, and how to combine 'soft evidences' in the 
safety assessment of a programmable system. The key idea is to split the larger entities of 
soft evidence into smaller quantities. Another difference is the comprehensive usage of 
continuous distributions in the VTT work, which is somewhat a different approach than the 
approach used in the HRP study. This is however not discussed in this paper. The merged 
networks show how the two approaches can be merged. It gives an extended description of 
the quality aspects, originally modelled by the node " in the VTT approach, and it shows 
how different operational profiles, can be included in the approach from HRP.  
5 Conclusions 
The conclusion from the research presented in this paper is that the use of Bayesian 
Belief Networks for combining disparate sources of information in the safety assessment of 
software based systems, combined with questionnaires, offers a systematic and promising 
mode of proceeding.  
The experiences with modelling the requirements of the avionics standard 
RTCA/DO-178B as a BBN, point in the direction that this approach can be transferred to the 
modelling of other software standards built on the same basic framework, and which follow 
the same principles. This holds even though they may differ in the aspect they put special 
emphasis on.   
The BBN was constructed in two levels. The higher level was based on the four 
qualities: quality of the producer, quality of the production, quality of the product, and 
quality of the analysis is general, and independent of the standard. The BBN was based on 
the research discussed in chapter 2 but there is a need for validation and experimental 
investigation with respect to the network. Results obtained from calculations on the BBN, as 
presented in (Gran et. al. 2000), seems not only to be a consequence of the 'soft evidences' in 
the lower level networks or the 'hard evidences' in the testing, but also a result of the 
underlying topology. The lower-level BBN, reflecting the recommendations of RTCA/DO-
178B, could also need a validation. A hypothesis is that a reallocation of objectives or 
questions only will give local (or partial) effects, and not changes in the overall assessment. 
A reason for this could be that there are a few 'soft evidences' and dependencies connecting 
this evidences which are more sensitive than the other. So fare, there has, however, not been 
possible to find such evidences.  
Although the BBNs and results were based upon a real application, this approach has 
not been applied to a real development or assessment. A first try could be to apply the 
approach for decision support in the approval of safety critical programmable systems. 
Another try could be to apply the approach as decision support early in the development of a 
system, for example as an intelligent product support system, in order to point on where to 
set in the effort and thus being able to reach specific objectives of the final product. 
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ABSTRACT: This paper describes an attempt to combine the Bayesian Belief Nets technol-
ogy with the rules of a standard for safety critical software, DO-178B, together with the 
evaluation of some of the results obtained by applying the approach on a real, safety related, 
programmable system. The research was done in an experimental project carried out by a con-
sortium composed of Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace AS, Det Norske Veritas, and the 
OECD Halden Reactor Project. First of all the project goal was to evaluate the use of BBN to 
investigate the implementation of the DO-178B standard for software approval in the com-
mercials world. To reach that objectives a computerized system for atomised transmission of 
graphical position information from helicopters to land based control stations was selected 
and studied. This paper describes some of the findings from the project, and discusses some 
of the results that were pinpointed as interesting, strange or counter-intuitive. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
There has been an increasing use of programmable digital equipment in safety critical 
systems. A problem in this respect has been the licensing of these systems, in particular of the 
embedded software. In practice the assessment of safety critical software is a matter of con-
sensus among experts based on judgement of a variety of evidences. To combine evidences 
from different information sources the use of Bayesian Belief Nets (BBN) has been proposed 
in quantitative assessment of the confidence in a programmable system.  
This methodology has mainly been developed and applied in the AI society. More re-
cently, however, it has also been applied to software safety assessment. Work in this area has 
been performed in two ESPRIT projects: SERENE and DeVa, and at the Centre for Software 
Reliability at City University in London and at the OECD Halden Reactor Project [1]. An at-
tempt to combine the BBN technology with the rules of a standard for safety critical software, 
DO-178B [2], was done in an experimental project, [3], carried out by a consortium composed 
of the OECD Halden Reactor Project, Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace AS and Det Norske 
Veritas. This paper shortly describes the test case (M-ADS) evaluated by the consortium, and 
puts emphasis on the results that were pinpointed as interesting, strange or counter-intuitive, 
and thereby needed an explanation. 
2 THE BBN METHODOLOGY 
A Bayesian Belief Net (BBN) is a connected and directed graph, consisting of a set of 
nodes and a set of directed arcs between them. Uncertain variables, both events and singular 
propositions are associated to each node where the uncertainty is expressed by a probability 
density. The probability density expresses our confidence to the various variable outcomes, 
and depends conditionally on the status of the parent nodes at the incoming edges. Some 
nodes are denoted as observables. They represent the different observable properties about 
the system for evaluation. The computation of our belief about a specific node (target node) is 
based on the rules for conditional probability calculations backward and forward along the 
edges, from the observable nodes, through the intermediate nodes to the target node [4], [5]. 
The construction of the BBN is normally made gradually. Information about the sys-
tem is collected and expressed via the nodes. The nodes are connected together to a directed 
graph that expresses the conditional relationship between the variables. The aim is to combine 
information in the net. One way is to start from a target node and draw edges to influencing 
nodes. To decide the direction of an edge, one follows the causal direction. However, this di-
rection is not always obvious, in particular between nodes representing qualitative variables. 
In these cases the direction of the arrow often goes from higher abstraction to lower abstrac-
tion, or from the more general concept to the more detailed. For computations of a realistic 
BBN computer tools are necessary. We have applied both the SERENE methodology [6] and 
the HUGIN tool [7]. 
3 THE TEST CASE 
3.1 M-ADS 
The project emphasized the practical evaluation of the BBN methodology by trying it 
out on a realistic test case: a computerized system for atomised transmission of graphical po-
sition information from helicopters to land based control stations (M-ADS). The M-ADS air-
borne equipment was designed by Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace AS for installation in 
helicopter aircraft. The system provides air traffic services with aircraft parameters upon re-
quest from the air traffic control where personnel will request positioning data. The M-ADS 
system is designed to automatically transmit flight information via data link to one or more 
requesting air control centers. M-ADS uses existing avionics on board the aircraft to provide 
aircraft position, speed and additional optional data. Most important are the aircraft position, 
position accuracy, altitude and time stamp for the data validity. The work described below 
uses parts of the M-ADS system to exemplify the software development process according to 
DO-178B standard. 
3.2 DO-178B 
The purpose of the DO-178B standard [2] is to provide a required guideline for the 
production of safety critical software for airborne systems. This guideline was chosen for the 
study since the M-ADS system is applied in civil aviation, and was previously qualified on 
the basis of this standard. DO-178B discusses aspects of airworthiness certification that per-
tain to the production of software for airborne systems and equipment used in aircraft. To aid 
in understanding the certification process the system life cycle is briefly discussed to show re-
lationship to the software life cycle process. It does not provide guidelines concerning the 
structure of the applicants organization, relations to suppliers and personnel qualification cri-
teria. 
The main recommendations in DO-178B are given in a set of 10 tables, see Table 3.1. 
Each table relates to a certain stage in the development and validation process, and contains a 
set of objectives. A difference between the DO-178B and IEC 61508 [8] is that most of the 
requirements are mandatory in IEC 61508, while the requirements are guidelines in DO-
178B, [9]. 
 
Table 3.1: The main recommendations in DO-178B  
 Stage in the development and validation process 
A1 Software planning process. 
A2 Software development process. 
A3 Verification of outputs of software requirements process. 
A4 Verification of outputs of software design process. 
A5 Verification of outputs of software coding & integration process. 
A6 Testing of outputs of integration process. 
A7 Verification of verification process results. 
A8 Software configuration management process. 
A9 Software quality assurance process. 
A10 Certification liaison process. 
3.3 The M-ADS  Evaluation 
The M-ADS evaluation consisted of several tasks. The first was to construct BBNs on 
the basis of DO-178B. The BBN was constructed in two levels. The higher level shows how 
nodes representing four quality aspects are combined with other nodes in the net, and leads to 
a node P(failed state), representing the probability of finding the system in a failed state, 
see Figure 3.1. The four quality aspects were: 
•= Quality of the producer. (Qproducer) This includes the reputation and experience of the 
producer, quality assurance policy, quality of staff etc. 
•= Quality of the production process. (Qprocess) A high quality implies that the system is de-
veloped according to guidelines for good software engineering, that all phases are well 
documented, and that the documentation shows that the system at all development phases 
possesses desirable quality attributes as completeness, consistency, traceability etc. 
•= Quality of the product. (Qproduct) This includes quality attributes for the final product, as 
reliability, simplicity, verifiability etc. 
•= Quality of the analysis. (Qanalysis) This includes all activities performed to validate the 
correctness of the system during all stages of the system development. Such activities may 
include model checking of the specifications, inspections and walkthroughs of the docu-
mentation, static analysis of code and testing of the system. 
The lower level BBNs were constructed by identifying the quality aspects with top-
nodes in four BBNs. Each top node was linked to intermediate nodes representing the 10 life-
cycle processes represented by the tables A1 to A10 of DO-178B. Each of these nodes was 
again linked to other intermediate nodes, representing the objectives of the tables. The further 
step was to identify a list of questions to each objective, see example in Figure 3.2. These 
questions were based on the understanding of the text in the main part of DO-178B, and then 
in general formulated so that the answer could be given by a yes or a no. 
The elicitation of conditional probability tables (cpt) to the nodes and edges was done 
as brainstorming exercises by all project participants, based on general knowledge and ex-
perience in software development and evaluation.  
Finally all this information together with observations from the system development 
(KDA) were fed into the HUGIN and SERENE tools, to make a variety of computations, with 
the aim to investigate different aspects of the methodology [3]. What is the effect of observa-
tions during only one lifecycle process? How does the result change by subsequent inclusion 
of observations from the lifecycle processes? How sensitive is the result to changes in indi-
vidual observations? 
Fig. 3.1:  The upper network 
 
Fig. 3.2: Example of a list of questions associated with a objective for the software develop-
ment process 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 What If More Observations Were Negative? 
4.1.1 The Partial Scenarios Results 
The effect of the observations during only one stage in the development and validation 
process showed with respect to the Qproducer that the effects were approximately the same 
for all the processes. With respect to the Qprocess the processes with largest effect were 
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verification of outputs of sw requirements process (A3), sw configuration management 
process (A8) and certification liaison process (A10), while an additional class other as-
pects, including aspects such as e.g. human machine interfaces, had lowest effect. With re-
spect to the Qanalysis the process other aspects had largest effect, but also all the other 
processes had a large effect. With respect to the Qproduct the processes with largest effect 
were identified as the verification of verification process results (A7) and other aspects. 
Quite low effect was observed for the processes: verification of outputs of sw design proc-
esses (A4) and the process A10.  
4.1.2 The effect of one negative and one “not positive” observations 
One particular notice about the applied observations from KDA was that one observa-
tion, with respect to process A4, was given the value 0. This value corresponds to a negative 
answer to the question Is the software partitioning integrity confirmed? However, whether 
this answer was meant to be negative; i.e. that this question is of importance to the reliability 
of the product, or if this question was ranked as irrelevant, was not further discussed. In the 
latter case it would have been better not to give any value to this observable node at all. This 
is equivalent to cutting the edge to this node. 
A further walk-through of the observations also identified that 6 questions, which be-
long to two or more of the quality aspect networks, were given different observations in the 
different sub-networks. Of these 6 questions, 1 belonged to the process A10, and was given a 
very low score for the Qproduct. (For the other divergences, the differences were smaller.)   
The result of correcting these faults was that the surprising low effect for A4 and 
A10 disappeared. And, the processes with low effect were now observed to be A1 and A8. 
These were both also identified as contributors to low effect for the other quality aspects. 
On the other hand, if one assumes that the questions should have been non-identical, 
and that the observations on these in fact were negative or low as entered, then we have iden-
tified a case where only two negative observations can lead to negative significant changes in 
the partial scenarios. 
4.1.3 How to select negative observations 
The latter result is related to the fact that the observations applied in the project were 
in general positive. An open question was therefore: what would be the result if more obser-
vations were negative? In particular, we were interested in the overall results after entering 
observations in all phases, and we wanted to search for a set of negative observations that 
belonged to all or more phases. The reason for the latter is that it is very little realistic to have 
good observation within 9 phases, and negative observations within the others. More realistic 
is that the negative observations are distributed over all phases. 
An attempt to find a such set of observations (out of a total of 71 observations) was to 
look into the set of observations (19 observations) that is related to two or three processes. 
These 19 observations can be divided into 5 groups as shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1:  The 5 groups of observations related to more quality aspects 
Group Related to quality aspect: Processes: 
1 QProduct, Qananlysis A4, A5, A7, other 
2 QProcess, Qananlysis A1, A2, A6 
3 QProduct, QProcess A5, A6 
4 QProduct, QProcess, QProducer A9, A10 
5 QProduct, QProcess, Qananlysis A3, A5 
4.1.4 The effect of some negative observations 
By entering negative observations to the questions related to the three groups we ob-
served the effects as shown in Table 4.2. Remark that all the other observations are held posi-
tive, and the effect of change is observed related to as observed by KDA, that is more or 
less all positive. As shown in the table, we see that there was only a significant effect on the 
Qproducer. That means that we by entering negative observations on the two questions re-
lated to processes A9 and A10, we achieve a lower confidence in good quality of the pro-
ducer. 
Table 4.2:  The effect of negative observations related to the questions from the groups 1-5. 
Gr. Observed Effect 
1 Minor effect to QProduct and Qananlysis 
2 Minor effect on QProcess, no effect on Qananlysis 
3 Minor effect on QProcess, no effect on QProduct 
4 No effect on QProduct, minor effect on QProcess, but significant effect on 
QProducer 
5 No effect on QProduct, minor effect on QProcess, and no effect on Qananlysis
4.1.5 The effect of 19 negative observations 
Based on the results presented above, the next scenario was to enter a negative obser-
vation on all the questions related to all the groups presented in Table 4.2. This had a signifi-
cant effect on all the quality aspects, and also the node P(failure state)as shown in Table 4.3 
and Table 4.4. An issue for further investigation is to look the combinations of these 19 to see 
how the results turn from positive towards negative. 
Table 4.3:  The effect of 19 negative observations on the node QProducer. 
Scenario good=5 4 3 2 bad=1 
KDA original1 0.145 0.782 0.070 8E-6 6E-8 
KDA corrected2 0.184 0.804 0.011 1E-6 1E-8 
19 negative 0.018 0.359 0.621 0.01 1E-6 
(1) as presented in 4.1.1, (2) after corrections as described in 4.1.2 
Table 4.4: The effect of 19 negative obs. on the nodes Qprocess, Qproduct and Qanalysis. 
Process Product Analysis Scenario 
good bad good bad good bad 
KDA original1 1.0 4E-7 1.0 3E-9 1.0 1E-9 
KDA corrected2 1.0 2E-7 1.0 1E-10 1.0 1E-9 
19 negative 0.039 0.961 0.117 0.883 0.993 0.007 
(1) as presented in 4.1.1, (2) after corrections as described in 4.1.2 
4.1.6 Discussion of the results 
One other observation from the results from the incremental scenario was that they 
reached stable maxima very fast. This indicates that the activities in the later stages in the de-
velopment and validation process have little effect. Similarly, the partial results were almost 
as good as complete results. These results were not as expected.  
One possible explanation is that a good score in one table is an indication of high qual-
ity during all phases, so that there also should be high scores in other tables. Another explana-
tion is that 19 questions are repeated in two or three tables. However, these two explanations 
are not necessarily different. The latter can be a way to use the BBN topology to express the 
first explanation; i.e. that certain types of observations are relevant for several of the devel-
opment phases associated with the tables. 
4.2 The difference in partial results for A4 and A5 
A third observation from the project was obtained by comparing the partial results 
from the lifecycle processes verification of outputs of software design processes (A4) and 
verification of outputs of software coding and integration process (A5). The good score 
for these were the same for the quality aspects producer and analysis, but A5 scored bet-
ter on process and in particular on product. To explain this difference, the differences in 
BBN topology, in the cpts, and in the observations are investigated.  
The investigation showed related to the partial results for the processes A4 and A5, 
that we have the effects of both neutralizing, conformity, enlargement and the effect of the 
observations alone, see details in Table 4.5.  
Table 4.5:  The partial results for the processes A4 and A5. 
Quality 
aspect 
Observed  
difference in 
A4 and A5 
Difference in  
topology 
Difference in 
observations
Effect of observations and  
topology (A4 vs. A5) 
Producer A4 = A5 differences in 
the cpts 
different  
observations
neutralize each other 
Analyses A4 = A5 different num-
ber of questions
no large 
differences 
conformity, i.e. A4 = A5 
Process A4 ! A5 differences in 
the cpts and to-
pology 
different  
observations
topology and observations pull in 
same direction (enlargement) 
Product A4 !! A5 different num-
ber of questions
different  
observations
although a different number of 
questions, the observations alone 
give the difference 
4.3 Consequences of the “A4 vs. A5” evaluation 
The comparison of the results for A4 and A5 can also explain the difficulty of finding 
a subset of observations that turns the results negative. Accordingly we shall expect problems 
with finding a subset of positive observations leading to stable maxims.  
These results also indicate the problems of performing a verification of a Bayesian Be-
lief Network. The reason is that two different groups of experts can come up with two differ-
ent BBNs.  If one then enters somehow different observations into these networks, there is a 
good chance of observing the same results for the target nodes. On the other hand, these re-
sults also point in the direction that two different BBNs should be based up on the same ob-
servations. This again is an argument in favour of the BBN-construction process applied: each 
objective in the guideline associated to a list of questions. 
5 DISCUSSION 
The research conducted addresses some of the observations pinpointed as interesting, 
strange or counter-intuitive in the project on combining the Bayesian Belief Nets technology 
with the rules of a standard for safety critical software, DO-178B for a real, safety related, 
programmable system. One results is the importance of a good quality assurance of the obser-
vations entered into a BBN. One the other hand, it also demonstrates that one negative obser-
vations can have a significant effect on a partial results. The evaluation has also showed that 
one negative observation, or a set of a few negative observations is not enough to change the 
overall results.  
The results also show that there can be a rapid change in the overall results, given a 
specific order of turning the observations. This work indicates that this change takes place 
somewhere in the middle of negative observations on a few repeated questions and 
negative observations on all repeated questions. A further evaluation can give more specific 
results. However, the evaluation has also showed that there is an effect of the combination of 
topology, cpts and observations. A pinpointed set of observations could therefore change by a 
change in the topology or a conditional probability table. 
Finally the evaluation points on some of the problems that one will be faced with 
wanting to perform a validation or verification of the BBN. One hypothesis is that the use of 
questionnaires can be a vital point. This is also a topic for further investigation. 
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